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THE RICARDIAN THEORY OF RENT. 
A STUDY OF THE TREATMENT OF THE DOCTRINE 
I N THE WRITINGS OF ECONOMISTS AND OF I TS 
RELATION TO THE SINGLE TA X PROPOSAL . 
***** 
The title of this thesis t ndtcates that the treatment will jall 
under two parts, the jtrst of whtch wtll deal wtth t he theory of rent 
proper , begtnntng with the law of rent as formu l ated by RtcaJ•do , and 
discussing the addtttons or corrections to the doatrtn e whtch later 
wrttera have su gges ted; while the second wtll show t he necessary de -
pendence of all S i ngle Tax scheme s upon thts theor•y, an d will examine 
the attitude of the followers of Henry George toward t he law . 
*-*-* -** -
1. 
THE THEORY OF RENT AS CRITICIZED. 
The theory of rent as formul ated by Ricardo in his "Principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation~" which appea red in 1817, is essen-
tially this : 
Rent is t he difference between t he product of a given amount of 
l a,bor and capital on a given piece of land and the product of an equal 
amount of labor and capital on land which just repays cultivation . It 
follo ws as a coroll ary that rent does not enter into price~ since price 
is the market value of the products of l and paying no rent. 
Ricardo reas ons in this way: 
On the first settling of a country ~ there is no rent . Each is at 
liberty to appropriat e to himself a portion of the mos t fertile land~ and 
no one pays for the use of the land since he can hel p himself. Gradually~ 
however , as population increases, the most f ertile l and s are taken up . 
-· and it becomes nec ess ary to bring into cultivation land of a second order 
of fertility in order to support the community . At that moment, rent 
appears . There are now in the community two orders of return f or a given 
investment of cap ital and labor , that on l and No. 1 exceeding that on 
land No. 2. Th i s excess is rent , and may be deme~~ ,ed from the cultivator 
-:,\~ :\~4 
• 
by the landlord , as the cultivator, if he took up land for himself of the 
order No. 2, w6uld still earn no greater r eturn for hi s labor than by 
cultivating land of the order No . 1, and turning over to the landlord the 
excess over the marg inal product on land No . 2. As time goes on , land of 
a third degree of fertility is taken into cultivation, inc reasing the rent 
on land No. 1, and at the same time allowing land No. 2 to pay rent . This 
continues successively as land of a fourth, fifth and sixth order of fer-
tility is brought into use . 
But before land of these lower orders of fertility is cultivated , it 
will be found profitable to increase the investment of capital on land of 
the fir·st quality . This additional capital will not increase the product 
of the first land as much as did the original outlay, yet it will return a 
product equal to that oeta.ined on land of the second quality by the ex-
pend iture of that amount of capital . And when cultivation passes to l and 
of the third quality , the return from the second outlay of capital will 
bear as rent a sum equal to the difference between the product of land of 
the second and land of the third quality . Additional investment of cap-
ital , then , affects rent as does the lowering of the margin of cultivation. 
It is evident from the foregoing that the price of produce is regu-
l ated by the cost of production on that quality of land, or with that por-
tion of capital which i s on the margin below which investment of capital 
and labor will · not be profitable. But rent is paid onl y from t hat produce 
wh ich is above t hat ~argin . Accordingly , rent can be no factor in price. 
a The rise of rent is alwe.ys the effect of the increa.sing .viea1 th of 
the country~ and of the difficulty of providing food for its au~mented 
population. It is a sympton , but never a cause of .wealth.n * 
Rent increases most .rapidly , as the disposable land decreases in its .pro-
'"'#f/1 duct i ve powers; while v1eal th , on the othe r hand , im reases most rapidly 
where the disposable land is most fertile and .where the difference in pro-
ductive power between the best lands and the .poorest lands in use - rent -
is not so great . 
Reduction of capital lowers rent , as population will fall off and 
~'Ch . 2 . Par . 29 
·4 
and the poorer 1ana.s WLLl oe T,nro.Ym oul; or ul:le . THe came LdLLng . w.t.t.t a..t.so 
r·esul t when i mp rovements in agrecul ture diminish t he necessity of cul ti vat-
ing the poorer lands~ or make possible a saving in the capital employed . 
Such i mprovements in agriculture are of two kinds : Those which actually 
increase the productive powers of the l and , and t hose which permit a saving 
of the labor expended upon i t . The former wi ll result in an absolute de-
crease of rent, as t he mar~in of cultivation i s brought up when the poorer 
lands are no l onger need ed . In case of the second ~ however , corn rent , 
the amount of produce which the l andlord can demand, will remain the s am e, 
~,.f 
as the same qualities of la.nd are still required to produce an_, amount of 
gr-ain f or consumpt i on, but the money rent of land will fall as the amount 
of capital required is lessened . If the whol e saving in cap ital can be 
mad e on that capital wh ich is least productively empl oyed, the corn rent 
wi ll also fall; otherwise , no t . 
Such is a summary of the second chapter of Ri cardo ' s "Principles 
of Political Economy and Taxation , u in which th e l aw is s et fortb . Ricardo 
had , however, t wo years previously printed a tract , an "Essay on the In-
fl uence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock, u in which he made 
use of this s ame theory of rent which he devel oped in hi s «Principles ," 
and to nhich he owes his chi ef cl ai m to fame . 
Yet , though the lai'i of rent is familiarly called by his nam e , i t 
was by no means original with him. This he recognizes in the .preface to 
the "Principl es , " where he stetes (p . 1) t hat"in 1815 Mr . Malthus , in his 
"Inquiry into t he Natu re and Progress of Rentu and a fe l low of University 
College, Oxford ," (Sir Edward West ), "in his "illssay on the Application of 
cap ital to Land," presented to the world, nearly at the same moment, its 
true doctrine of rent . v Neither of t hese writers , however, deserves the 
distinction of having fir st formulated t he l aw, for t hat was do ne ~ and in 
much better form , by Dr . James Anderson of Hermanston in Midlothia . n, as 
ea rly as 1777, in a tract entitled «An Inquiry into the Nature of the Corn 
Laws , with a view to the Corn Bill proposed for Scotland. " The expo s ition 
of t he l aw by Anderson i s in much clearer form than that of West or Malthus , 
and approacnes very c~ose~y ~ne rormu~a~1on or ~1caruo . ur. Anaerson .proves 
that rent cannot enter into price, and makes use of an illustration of mar~ 
ginal cul t~:va,tion and its relation to rent which is practically · identical 
with that of Ricardo. He does not , however, mention the possibility of a 
creation of re!ft by the successive investment of capital in land of the first 
quality . Farther back the,n ~nderson , it is not prof i ta.bl e to go . Quesnay 
might be mentioned as having some insight into the facts of the margin of 
cultivation, but the first formulation of a law is certainly due to Dr. 
~nderscn . 
It will readily be seen from a perusal Of the chapter on rent that 
Ricardo has formul~ted his theo ry in language which is not wholly clear~ 
and he often leaves essential facts to be inferred . On this acco~nt, i f 
on no other, he would be liable to critic ism, and the critics hc,ve not been 
backwa,rd in attacking him, many of them offering amendments which a strict 
follower of Ricardo mi ght say were implied in the original statement. 
' Criticism of Ricardo's law may be divided into two periods, the one 
extending from the formulation of the theory is 1817, to the work of Walker 
on the subject , and the second extending from Walker to the present day. 
Each period may be again d ivided into two sections , the first dealing with 
those who fav or the. Ricard i an law, tho suggesting modificat ion, and t he 
second wi th those who would cast it out entirely, or so change it as to 
make it unrecognizable . These divisions , which appear to be the most 
natural , if not the most strict in matter· of time, vrill be adopted i n 
this thesis. A short summa ry of the main amendments and objections wil l 
be made at the end of each sectiqn, and a statement of the general tendency 
of the c rit i cism will be given at the end . The works of no German or 
French authors are examined in this thesis; yet their c riticisms a re em-
bodied in it, since their idea s sooner or later work themselves into 
English economics, and confront us in that shape . The method of examining 
the work of each author sepe.rately has been adopted in preference to that 
of fixing upon lines of criticism and following them through succ essive 
stages , not only because it is easier for reference, but because parallel 
i deas are of t en original with several authors . and each des erves to stand 
or fall by their worth. Further than this, many authors , especial ly in the 
earlier years after the formulation of the theory , feel insecure in their 
own positions, favoring one idea in one paragraph , and another in the next. 
It is chiefly on this account that the work of each auth6r i s kept separate, 
for by that method we are able to see where each one places himself, either 
by reference to his own words or to the theory on which he works; and if he 
happens to be undecided, that fact , too . is apparent. The lines of criti-
. . cism are sufficiently indicated in the summaries . 
A 
--. 
CRITICISM OF RENT FROH MALTBUS TO 'l?ALI<ER. 
1. Followers of Ricardo. (Chiefly cl assical economists.) 
The firs t of the critics of Ricardo to des erve notic e is hi s famous 
cont emporar y, Mal t hus. While Malthus recognized t he influence of t he 
ma r gin of cultivation on rents~ he did not grant it the supr em e importance 
whi ch it as sumes in the Ri ca rd i an theory. He held (Principl es of Politi-
c al Economy, Ch . 3,Par . 1),that r ent was due to three factors, or "causes of 
t he excess of the pric e of raw produce above t he costs of production," 
namely: 
"First, and mai nly, that quality of t he earth, by which i t can be 
made to yield a greater portion of the necessaries of lif e t han is requi red 
for t he maint enance of the persons employed on the l and . 
"2ndly, That quality peculi ar to the necessaries of life of being 
able, when properly distributed, to create thei r own demand , or to raise 
up a numb er of demanders in proportion to the quantiti es or necessaries 
produced. 
rr And, 3dl y, The compar at ive scarcity of fe r tile l and , either natural 
or artifici al." 
Reasoning from these premises, it is evident that the criticism of 
Malthus can of f er no great advance from the ori~ i nal of Rica rdo , as only 
one of Malthusa t hree causes of the exces s is of value, i. e., the third. 
The other two suppose some peculiar quality in the earth or its products 
which enters into rent , a false premise. 
Malthns ' criticism of Ricardo i s incorporated into his ((Principles 
of Political Economy, " where it appears i n the text, and in foot~notes as 
well . It i s difficult to separate passages in which ~fal thus criticizes 
Ricardo from some in which he is merely advancing his own theory. and con-
sequently an account of his criticism must be somewhat piecemeal. Yet as 
Malthns ' cr i ticism itself is piecemeal, presenting no co~rdinated whole , 
this method of examining his ideas may be advantageous . 
The work of Malthus on this subject may be examined under the following 
headings , nhich contain the points of chief importance: 
A. Influence on rents of a supposed d iminution of fertility . Malthus 
discusses this supposed case~ both in text and in a note. His position is 
stated succ i nctly in t he note (Oh. 2 , Par.1) , and we may confine our attention 
to that . It reads as follows : 
aMr . Ricardo (P.of Pol . Econ. and Taxat ion, Gh . 23) has supposed a case of 
a diminution of fertility of one-tenth, and he thinks that it would increase 
rents by pushing capital upon less fertile land. I think, on the contrary, 
t hat in any well cultivated country it could not f a il to lower rents , by 
occasioning the withdrawing of capital from the poorer soils . If the last 
land before in use would do but little more than pay for the necessary 
labor and a profit of ten per cent. upon the capital employed, a diminution 
of a tenth- part of the gross produce would certainly render many poor soils 
no longer worth cultivating. And , on Mr . Ricardo ' s supposition, where, 
I would ask, is the increased demand and increased price to come from 7 when, 
from the ,greater- quantity of la,bor and capital necessary for the l and , the 
means of obtaining the precious meta]s , or any other commodit i es~ to ex-
change for earn. would be greatly reduced?" 
This critici sm can hardly be said to be valid. Malthus evidently 
considers that in case of such a diminution of fertility , capital would be 
withdrawn where it did not yield it s ten per cent., and that a portion of 
the human race would quietly drop off, as there would no longer be food to 
support them. It seems mo re reasonable to hold with Ricardo that t his 
port ion of t he human race would prefer to labor harder than before in order 
t o produce goods to exchange for food . This fall of wages , added to the 
actual increase of goods exchanged for a given supply of f ood, would make 
it prof itable to cultivate lands of poorer quality . And i n that case rents 
would rise as may be seen from the fol l owi ng case . Suppose the grades of 
l and i n use to wi el d respectivel y 100, 90. 80 , 70, 60 quar t ers of ~rain . 
Rent on t he highest land is then 40 . But suppos e the fertility of each 
grade to be lowered one-tenth. In t hat case our land produces 90 , 81 , 72, 
• 63 , 54 quarters , or a total of 360 quarters as opposed to the total of 400 
quarters obtained before. Accordingly , it wi ll be necessary to use the 
next grade of l and at 45 in ordar to bring the quantity of produce up to 
the amount demanded , and we must r eckon rents from this new marg in. In t hat 
case we find rents are at 135 i nstead of at 100 , or that t hey have risen 
r ap idly. 
Malthus asks where t he i ncreased dem and and increased price are to 
come from . The i nc reased demand arises naturally t hrough the law of 
comp et ition. Given l ess of t he produce whil e the body of consumers rema i ns 
the same, and t he demand f or each unit of the produce increases, i . e. , 
the ratio between the numbers of persons des iring a commodi t y and the .:tmount 
of t hat commocli ty saleab.le becomes· greater. Prices ar e accordingl y hi,gher , 
and these i ncreas ed prices are pa i d by the laborers who now devote a larger 
portion of their income than formerly to the purchase of food . Of course 
we must bear in mind as a minimum for thi s supposed decrease i n fertility 
that t he marg inal l and , after the decrease, shall sti l l be abl e to support 
the l abo r expended i n its cul tivation. 
B. Distinction between the rent of l and yielding natural monopolies 
e and that yielding necassa.ries. 
.. Ricardo do es not recogn i ze any distinction between t he rent of lands 
yield ing monopolies , such as certain vineya.rds of superior quality,and the 
r ent of those yielding ordinary produce . Malthus, however~ attempts to 
draw a distinction (Ch . 3~P.1) , cla i mi ng that increase of fertility in the 
case of a vineyard would tend to dimi ni sh the excess of the pric e over t he 
cost of production of wine on it , si~ce competition for that kind 
of wine vlOuld not be so keen , but that if the fertility were de-
creased, the rent mi ght rise to almost any extent . He s ays : 
"In all commo n monopolies, the price of the produce , and consequemtly 
• the excess of price above the cost of production, may increase without any 
definite bounds . In the partial monopoly of the land which produces 
necessa,ries, the price of the produce cannot by any possibility exceed the 
value of the labor which i t can maintain; and the excess of its price 
above cost of its production is subjected to a limit as i mpassable. " 
"In short, in the one case~ the power of the produce to exc eed in 
pr ice the cost of the production depends ma i nly upon the degree of the 
monopoly : in the other , it depends entirely upon the degree of fertility . " 
Ricardo ' s repli is as follows: ~ 
"This distinct ion does not appear to me to be well founded; for you 
wo uld as surely raise the rent of lancl yielding scarce wines , as the r ent of 
corn l an.d , by increas i ng the abundance of its produce , if , at the same time, 
the demand for this peculia~ produce increased ; and without a similar in-
creas e of demand, an abundant supply of corn would lower inst ead of raise 
the rent of corn land . Whatever the nature of the land may be, high rent 
must depend on the hi gh price of the produce; but given the high price , 
rent must be high in proportion to abundance and not to scarcity." 
Mal tbus takes exception to thi s in a foot - note: 
a;iA r . Ricardo says ( p. 505), in ansHer • • • 1 that given the high price , 
A rent must be high in proportion to abundance and not to scarcity, ' whether 
in peculiar vineyard s or on common corn lands . But this is begging the 
whole of the question. The pricE> cannot be given. By the forc e of 
external demand and diminished SUI'PlY the produce of an acre of Ohampaigne 
,grapes might permanently command fifty: times the labor that had been em-
played in cultivating it; but no possible i ncrease of external demand or 
' · ; nuti on of suppl ~.-; could ever P.· ermanently enable the produce of an acre O.lm.. - - . _ _ .> 
of corn to command more labor than it : could support . ~' 
The reasoning of this passa.g·:; is not clear e.1:1ough to refute Ricardo 's 
criticism. A cs.reful examination of the last sentence shows the fault . 
I 
Malthus speaks of a case where the "p~aduce of an acre of Champaigns grapes 
might permanently command fifty times the labor tnat had been employed in 
cultivating it; but no possible increase of external demand or diminution 
... of supply could ever permanently enable the produce of an acre of cor·n to 
_, 
command more labor than it would suppcrt. " In the case of the grapes , it 
i s a matter of commanding fifty times the labor ~~E!~~~~· while in the 
case of the corn land, it is a metter of commanding several times the 
labor !2gQJ2Q£!~~ · If Mal thus spE:aks ,of l~QQ£ ~J;!!l2l2Y~~ in the first part of 
I 
his sentence, to make the paralld he must deal with !.~QQ£ ~l.!!El~:Y~£ in the 
second. Gr anted that the acre Cif grapes commands fifty times the labor 
I 
employed; is there any reason wl1y t~e acre of corn should not do the same, 
if the excess of produce o·ver the amount raised on mar·ginal land, rent, 
were high enough? Or, to look llt it the other way, can the acre of grapes 
comma.nd more labor than it can suppor-·~. . while the cor·n land finds this 
i mpossible? In the final analy:~ is, the vineyard cannot do this, for the 
I 
laborer must be able to exchange his lportion of the produce of the vine-
yard for a sum sufficient to pro,ride :1im with necessaries. The vineyard 
need not yield the actual produc·:. whieh the l aborer lives on, but it does 
yield his means of getting such ::teces;saries; and if it cannot yield enough 
for him to secure them, it cannot command his services. 
In spite of Malthus ' opinion to the contrary, there seems to be no 
difference between demand and su ~ply, in the case of the vineyard, and in 
the case of the corn land . AccJrding to a strict interpretation of Mal-
thus ' i dea, the theory of rent wJuld work only on l and yielding the staple 
food of a nation. As soon as a farmer should raise peas instead of corn , 
he must reckon with this new kini of demand and supply, in as much as he 
is dealing i n a commodity .not absolutely essential to the maintenance of 
life , and one whose price is regt latec: by the desires and not by the needs 
of t he consumers . We might put it ' j_n this way: The desi r es of men are 
as pot ent a force in determining the 'price and the rent of goods , as are 
t heir needs . Malthus allows onl y the needs of bare subsistence to enter 
into his calcul ations ~ and aeeorcingl<y· falls into error. 
c. The Value of Rent . 
Ricardo considered that t he peculiar ability of land to bear rent 
was no advantage. He says : ~ awhed land is most abundant~ when most 
·:.e productive, and most fertile# it yiel:ds no rent; and it is only when 
its powers decay , and l ess is yielded in return for labor , t hat a share 
of the origi nal produce of the mere fertile po rtions is set apart for rent." 
Mal t hus , on the other hand., in accordance with his views on rent as 
the r es ul t of an absolute fertility, as well as of the r elative , naturally 
opposes this statement, and considers this peculiarity a veritable «gift 
of Providence. " Be holds 't' that ·~'if t his transfer " (of rent) "can be con-
sidered in juri ous , then every increase of capital and population must be 
considered as injuriousn because rent' is a consequence of i ncreased capi t c;1 
and population . He seems in t hi .s stat ement to have missed the point at 
issue. No one denies that it is an advantag e to have i nc r eased capi te,l 
and popul ation~ but it is held that t hi s advantage i s accompanied by a dis-
advantage , the fact that a part cf the produce of the soil~ a part which 
I is a social product , must be tran sf e~r ed to one who happens to be t he owner 
of the soil . Further on, Malthus regards the power of the soil to support 
more than must labor upon it as one of the greatest bl essings possible. 
I 
And so it is , but this does not deny the fact t hat the interest of the 
l andlords is not the interest of the people at large. 
Here Malthus singul arly fails to hit the core of Ricardo ' s argument . 
Ricardo holds rent to be an evil, as it appears only when l abor cannot 
get on all lands as great a return as formerly, i . e. , the ability of one 
man to get more than another is BO benef it. Malthus , in attacking t his 
position, states t hat fertility, the power of land to support more than 
*P . of Pol. Econ . and Taxation~Ch . 2, ~ar . 2B . 
tch . 3 , Par . 2 . 
need cultivate it, is an inestimable b~on to humanity. Well , so it is, 
but emphasis l aid upon it by no means sheds any light upon the question 
of relative fertility with which alone we are concerned . Malthus is 
continually led astray by his belief in fertility, as such. 
D. The rise of rent and the farmer . 
According, to Ricardo , the riBe of rent does not affect the farmer 
e as his income results solely fr·om profits and l a.bor. 
' 
Malthus says on this subject:* "Yet does not the fall of profi ts 
go to rent? It is of very littl e consequence to the farmer and laborer, 
even on Mr. Ricardo~ s theory, tha.t they continue to receive between them 
the same nominal sum of money , if that sum in exchange for necessaries is 
not worth half what it was before~D Undoubtedly, it profits fall, the 
surplus goes to the landlord. If the current r ate of interest on capital 
falls from ten per cent. to eight per cent., the landlord can demand the 
additional two per cent . without dan,9.,er of t he tenant leaving the farm for 
some more profitable business . Yet this does not show that the rise of 
rent falls on the farmer . The rise cf rent does not affect the farmer 
on this supposition, but the fall of frofits of the farmer affects rent. 
How can the rise of rent fall on the farmer~ when as a ~recpndition to 
that rise of rent there must be a necessity on the part of the farmer to 
work for less? It i s a case of farmer affect rent, and not of rent affect 
farmer . 
E. The Fall of Wages and Rent . 
Ricardo is cf the opinion that no fall of wages can affect rent, 
inasmuch as the portion of produce to be divided between the farmer and 
the laborer remains the same, acc:or~_ ing to his theory that a fall in 
wages occasio1ms a rise in profita, and vice versa. 
Malthus criticizes him as fallows : t "But where, I would ask , will 
the high real wages of America f i nally go? to profits? or to rent ? 
If laborers were permanently to receive the value of a bushel of wheat 
a day , none but the richest landB could pay the expense of working them. 
~Ch . 3 , Par. 2 ,not e . 
TCh. 3 , Par. 3 ,note. 
-An i ncrease of population and a fall o:f such ,.,,ages vmuld be absolutely 
necessary to the cultivation of poor l ~nd . How then can it be said 
that a fall of wages i s not one of the causes of a rise of rents?" 
Unless Ricardo 's theory of the relationship between profits and wages 
is correct, and accordi ng to modern economist s it is not, Maltbus has t he 
better of this . If wages fall, ~he expense of cultivation is less, al low-
ing the margin of cultivat ion to be lowered , which, in turn , r aises rents, 
i. e., E1 fall of wages does lower r ent. 
F. Rent and Price. 
Ri cardo considers that rent cannot enter into price, as price i s deter-
mi ned by the marginal cost of production, wh ic h has nothing to do with rent. 
Malthus denies thi s , * holdin~ that the natural price "must on an aver-
age be at l east equal to t he costs of its production on the worst l and 
actually cultivated, together with the rent of such l and i n its natural 
state: because, if it falls in any degree below this , the cultivator of 
such l and will no t be able to pay the landlord so hi gh a rent as he could 
obtain fr om the l and without cultiva.t i.on, and consequently th e land will 
be left uncultivated, and the produce will be diminished." This statement 
shows the influence of Malthus' theory that fertility in its elf creates 
rent , but it also s hows a fore-shadowing of the modern theory t hat mar ginal, 
as distinguished from differentia l rent, does en te r price. 
G. C~±ticism of Method . 
Mal thus sayst that "Mr. Ricardo, who generall y looks to permanent and 
f i nal resul t s , has al ways pursued an opposite policy in r ef erence to rents · 
of l and ." This critici sm is we __ l-_founded, and i s the for e- rm1ner of many 
another crit ic's complaint of t he style and methods of RicarcJo . In this 
case referred to , Ricardo ill his c rit:Lcism of Adam Smith's expos ition of 
the fact that r ents are highe r in a r~ce than in a corn count ry does look 
to temporary and i mm edi ate r ather than far- reaching effects. This crit i -
cism of Malthus i s upheld by Marshall in his aPrinciples of Economics . "+ 
Again , Malthus justl y criticizes Ricardo f or the emphasis upon rent 
* Ch. 3 , P a,r. 5 t Summary , Par .10 
+ " Princ1p l es of Economics," p .67 2 . 
as a proport ion, rather t han a portion, of the produce. He maintains 
that rents may still be said to rise if the landlord obtains more actual 
produc e ~ regardless of whether his propo r tion of the whole ~reduce is 
greater or less. 
It may be wondered, i nasmuch as much of t he critici sm of Malthus is 
erroneous, why he is considered an adherent rather t han an opponent of the 
Ricardian theory. In spite of many misconceptions , however~ he does 
belong in the place assigned him. At bottom, his theory of rent was yery 
similar to that of Ricardo, and much of his criticism a~ose from the le.ck 
of a clear understanding of the R ica~d ian theory , rather than from inherent 
and irreconcil able differences of opinion . He finds much fault with 
Ricardo's statement , and does not allow himself to see that Ricardo 's 
I 
theory is built uoon the same foundat i on as his own . ,.__ _____ .._ ____________________ .. ____________ _ 
James Mill, in his "Political Economy," 1821, gives a concise expo-
sition of economic rent in the Ricardian sense, but pays no attention to 
necessary modif ications in the theory in the case of urban and s ite rent. 
Hi s treatment i s clear , and one of his figu rative express ions ~ "doses of 
capital ,N has become a classic . His comments on the l aw are confined 
entirely to the refutation of the cri t ici sm that the l aw must be invalid 
because there is no land in Great Britain whi ch does net pay rent. This 
fallacy he exposes under three heads. 1. Suc h rent is often merely 
nominal and may be left out of calculation. 2. In some countries, 
such as Ar abia, there is land absolulely incapable of ever paying rent. 
3. Portions of a f arm which bears r ent may still be able to bear none if 
taken separ atel y. Furthermore, on every f arm there is an investment of 
capital .which pays no rent. Such is the Feasonable, but wholly agri-
cultural exposition of Mill. 
' 
--------------------
In 1838 J. B. MacOull och published an edition of t he "Wealth of 
Nations" which contains admirable notes on the several economic doct rines. 
Especially is his exposi tion of the theory of rent of high excellence , 
in fact the best that had appeared, presenting an advance over the origi nal 
doctrine of Ricardo, in that it not only criticizes and amend s the original 
theory, but in that it relieves it of much of its abstract and unpractical 
nature. 
We examine the several points made by MacCulloch under the followine 
heads : 
A. The theory put upon a practical basis. 
MacCulloch asserts that "It is not necessary in explaining th e nature 
of rent to resort to hypothetical cases.» In support of this stat ement, 
.. he shows the actual condition of the tillage of land at the time, and ex-
pl a ins from actual figures the necessary excess of the product of fertile 
l ands aver the product of the worst lands actually in cultivation. He is 
constantly, throughout his exposition, endeavoring to indicate the bearing 
of the law of rent on actual conditior.s, and is careful to formulate excep-
tions and l imitations of Ricardo 1 s swe:eping statements. As an example of 
this~ we may take his painstaking explanation of the gradation of land and 
capital. He is careful to say* that "The decline in the proportional re-
turn to capital does not take place at regul a r intervals nor successive 
stages, but gradually and imperceptibly." • "Every bushel • • would 
probably cost more than that which preceded it." In this case, as he 
demonstrates , the actual rent obtainec would amount up more quickly than 
under t he larger gradations of Ricardo . 
B. Site Hent. 
Though it is implicit in his theory, Ricardo neglects to a ~reat ex-
tent the effect of advantages of situc\tion, nearness to market , cost of 
transportation to market, etc., on rent. MacCulloch pays much attention 
to t hese f actors, however, and showst that "the land which is nearest to 
the market , and pays least for carriage , has the same sort of a.dvan tage 
over the others that it would have we re it more fertile." Nearness to 
roads and rivers may act in the same way , and the greater the distance 
from which the marg i nal article in the market comes , the greater rent 
will land in the immediate vicinity pay in proportion to its fe rtility. 
The clear understanding of this principle of site rent is necessary tc 
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the comprenens1on or the theory ot rent, ana MacuuJ.locn, oy empnas1Z1ng 
it, has opened a way to insight into the true implications of the theory, 
putting its discussion on a more rational basis than before. 
c. Rent from Monopoly. 
MacCulloch says, "The two principles of rent--fertility and proximity 
to market--are totally distinct from those peculiarities of soil or situa-
tion which afford a rent on the principle of monopoly.') Certain kinds of 
·li.r::e may , from deficiency in t he supply , bring a price utterly unpropor-
tioned to the cost of production, and the whole of the excess , o~er the 
ordinary profits of stock and wages , goes to the landlord. "Land occupied 
with dwelling houses~ gardens or parks, and possessing peculiar beauties 
of situation or disposition, is also of the nature of a monopolized article 
and its rent is governed entirely by the demand . It cannot indeed yield 
less rent than if it were devoted to agriculture, but it may yield a vast 
deal more.n MacCulloch has here laid down a principle which brings urban 
rent into the general theory~ though as we shall see from later criticism, 
it is hardly advisable to speak of rent for· site value as a. monopoly rent . 
Monopol y in this sense comes more from limitation. of ownership than limita-
tion of supply, and the owners of adva.nta,geous sites are too numerous to 
allow the term "monopoly rent" for their income. 
D. The rent of mines . 
Ricardo holds that rent of mines is determined on precisely the same 
principles that govern the r~nt of corn land . Mr . MacCulloch, however, 
draws one distinction. Capital employed in mines is not subject to the 
law of diminishing return~. since, if production becomes more difficult 
owing to greater depth, the capital first expended is not yielding any 
gr ea,ter return because it has already been used up . That is to say , in 
mines, capital cannot have two rates of return. As a result of this fact, 
and because mines are not successively graded in productivity as is land, 
there may be a rent paid on the least productive mine . For the entre-
preneur of that mine may sell his product at a pr ice just below that which 
would bring another mine into use, and at the same time get more than tbe 
oro.inar·y return to capi taJ. 1n tne snape or pror1 ts; ana. this excess must 
go to rent. 
E. Emphasis on certain vital points . 
(a.) MacOullach emphasizes the fact that much misu_nderstanding 
of the theory of rent has arisen from overlooking the fact that rent depends 
as much on the return from successive ~doses" of capital, as from the rele.-
tive fertility of soils. In speaking of the formation of rent, Ricardo 
himself often speaks of the relative fertility only; but ahen criticising 
him , it must be remembered that the idea of the successive employment of 
capital is inherent in his theory and that when he does not mention it, he 
assumes it. 
(b.) Capital plays a more important part in the theory than 
.. 
does fertility. The successive application of capital to land is really 
more important than the fact that land differs in fertility . This explains 
the statement that all land in a given country might bear rent. The rent, 
however, on the least fertile soil is occasioned by the difference in returns 
to capital, and not to the relative fertility of the soil . 
(c.) MacCulloch gives a masterly exposition of the effect of 
improvements on rent. His position is the same as that of Ricardo, but 
the ideas are more fully developed and are better expressed . 
We may summarize the influence of MacCulloch on the theory of rent: 
Not only did he relieve it of much of its abstract and unpractical nature, 
but he distinguished from rent due to the relative fertility of the soil 
that obtained on account of superior market facilities, and that which he 
considered due to monopoly . 
N. W. Senior, writing on "Political Economy" in the "Encyclopaedia 
Metropolitana" (1850), characterizes Ricardo 's shortcomings most aptly. 
Be says of him: "He was not enough master of logic to obtain precision, 
or even to estimate its importance. Eis sagacity prevented his making 
sufficient allowance for the stupidity or carelessness of his readers; 
and he was too earnest a lover of truth to anticipate wilful misconstruction. 
• 
"Under tl1e influence of these caus es, he is, perhaps, the most in-
correct writer who ever attained philosophical eminence; and there are 
few subjects on which he has been guil ty of more faults of expression 
than on rent . n 
Senior goes on to give examples of these faults of expression , con-
fining his criticism to explanation r ather than to correction. He asserts 
t hat Ricarto «perceived that an increased will and power on the part of the 
communi ty to purchase raw produce, and the impossi bility of increasing the 
supply bu.t at an increased expense, must necessarily raise rents, and mus t 
also occasion an extension of cultivation.}} Associating , therefore , in his 
own mind , the ideas of the rise of rents and of t he extension of cultivation, 
he of ten spoke of t hem in the relation of cause and effect, a relationship 
which Senior denies . Senior appea rs to be ri ght in his contention . Rents 
rise , not because cultivation is extended to poorer soils , but because cul-
tivation could extend to such soils, and yield the ordinary returns to cap-
ital and labo~ and, moreover , the existence of such soils is not neces-
sary. As Senior says further on in critic ism of Ricardo ' s havin~- a spoken 
of the existence of rent as dependent on t he cul tivation of land of differ-
ent degrees of fer til ity, or on the fact that the same land repays , with a 
proport ionally smaller return , the application of additional capital , n it 
is possible to imag,i ne t ha.t all land from which a market could draw its 
produce were of a uniform high fertility , and permitted of only a uniform 
investment of capital. In that case, it is clear that it would yiel d a 
high rent , not on account of its fert i lity , as the older economists would 
ha.ve us believe, but because prof its ( pJ.~ ic e having risen under competition 
of the consumers ) would be higher than i n other unde rtakings; and the 
landlord could take this exces s to himself without forcing the cultivators 
into other enterprises. Senior , th en, has done valuable work in s howing 
that the depression of the marg in of cultivation is not the cause of the 
rise of rent. but that the same cause---excess of profits---wh ich raises 
r ent ; also proport ionately lowers the margin of cultivation. 
Be further criticises Ricardo's defence of his theories wh en confronted 
• 
' 
by the argument that all land in a gi~en country yields rent . Ricardo 
I 
often denies the fact, when his posit ion is unassailable i f he grants 
the f act , but emphasises this, that though the land yield rent, there 
is still upon t hat land a marginal i nves tment of capital which earns 
but the common rate of profits , and pays no mo r e r ent. Ricardo laid 
hi msel f open to such criticism i n the first place, by speaking of the 
"~o rn raised on l and p~ying no rent" when he meant "the corn raised 
I 
I 
without the payment of rent;" in other words , he left rent as arising 
f.rom successive applications of capital out of the discussion , where it 
very properl y belonged. 
Senior also calls attention to that much criticised passage in 
wh ich Ricardo refers to rent as an evil, not as a blessing, because it 
arises only when the powers of the land decay. Senior points out that 
the fact of high ferti l ity in the first plac e is a good and must receive 
I 
recognition as such; the fact that 1ther l and is not so fertile as that 
first cultivated is an evil , but it by no means outweighs the original 
' good . All of this discussion bears little on the fundamental questions 
of the theory of rent itself, however . 
----.,.-·-
1 John Stuar t Mill, in his aPrincipl es of Pol i tical Economy ,') 1864, 
d i d much in the analysis of the var ious features of rent, t hough no t 
advancing his remarks as direct criticism of Ricardo. Like MacCulloch~ 
he endeavored to amplify and explain \ the law of r ent , adding valuable 
inst<:mc es and exceptions, rather than to contradict it or establish i t 
upon new princ i ples . Li ke Ricardo , lhe is somewhat abstract i n his dis -
cussion, and he did nothing to bring the applicat ion of the law to every-
day li fe . 
He has written a most valuable chapter* on the eff ect of progress of 
r ent , wages and profits. As his work on thi s subject is final, perm i tt ing 
l ittle improvement ~ we may examine his treatment of it, and not r ecur to 
it again , as later writers deal with progress in no better terms. 
Mill discusses the influence of progress in several contingencies 
~'Book I v. Ch .3. 
aS .[ OLL 0 W>5~ 
1. When populat ion increases, but capital remains stationary. 
wages fall and profits rise, as more labor is obtainable with the 
same capital . Rents rise , as laborers curtail other expenses for food, 
and this increased demand for food forces the margin of cultivation to 
a lower level. The rise is two-fold, "for, in the first place, rent 
in kind , or corn rent, will rise; and in the second, since the value 
of agriculture produce has also risen, rent, estimated i n manufactured 
• or forei gn commodit-ies (which is represented caeteris paribus by money 
rent) will rise still more.u Rent may be the sole gainer in this case, 
for "To produce the food for the increased number may be attended with such 
an increase of expense , that wages , thou,gh reduced in quantity , may repre-
sent as great a cost, may be the product of as much labor, as before, and 
t he cap italist may not be at all benefited. On this supposition, the loss 
to the laborer is partly absorbed in the additional labor required for pro-
ducing the last instalment of agricultural produce; and the remainder is 
gained by the landlord, the only sharer who always benefits by an increase 
of popul at ion. 
2. When capital increases and population remains stationary. 
"The real wages of labor, inst ead of falling , will now rise; and 
since the cost of production of the things consumed by the laborer is 
not diminished , this rise of wag es implies an equivalent increase of the 
cost of l abor , and diminution of profits ." In t his instance, rent also 
rises, for the laborers , on account of their higher wages, will eat more 
and better food, as well as tend to reproduce more r apidly , thus forcing 
the margin of cultivation downwards . 
3. When population and capital rise simultaneously. 
More food is now demanded, and arent will rise, both in quantity of 
produce and in cost; while wa_ges , being, supposed to be the same in quantity, 
will be greater in cost," i. e., money wagea ris e. "And as t he ris e is 
common to a.ll branches of production, the capitalist cannot indemnify him-
self by changing his employment , and the loss must be borne by profits. 
and capital remain stationary. 
(a) When improv.:ements are made only in those products classed_ as 
I 
luxuries, the different classes benef~t only as consumers. 
(b) When improvements are made in the production of necessaries, 
we have two cases: 
: (1) When the improvement does not increase the produce, but enables 
I 
it to be obtained at less expense. Ih that case prices fall. Money rents 
fall then, while corn rents remain the same. 
(2) When improvements increase the produce at the same expense. In 
this case, prices fall as before, and: money rents as well. But in this case, 
I 
corn rents fall also, as l and is forced out of cultivation. 
I 
In this case (b), for a time wages and profits remain the same, but 
the increased comfort made possible by the fall in price of the agricultural 
products will act as a stimulus to population~ and money wages will finally 
fall, and profits rise. 
The same effec·t, a fe,ll in rent, would take place if a nation 
changed its diet to a cheaper staple ,of food, since the cost of supporting 
labor would be less, and less land would be required. Ultimately~ however, 
as population increased, land would ~ear more rent, as its potential ex-
tension of cultivation would be greater . 
5. When population, capita~ and improvements increase at the 
same time. 
In this case, the actual ef~ect will be different from that of any 
I 
of the hypothetical cases. ImprovemJnts, being in practice gradual , cause 
no retrogression of rent, but enable 'it to rise and population to increase 
after they would otherwise have stopped. Improvements in production are 
, in fact accompanied by increas ed demand for food, and are consequently in 
the long run beneficial to the l andlord . 
Mill summarizes these results as f0llows:~ 
"The economical progress of a society constituted of landlords, 
capitalists and laborers, tends to the progressive enrichment of the land-
lord class ; while the cost of the laborer's subsistence tends on the whole 
.. 
,.,.. t ' acting force to the last two errec s; but the first , though a case is con-
ceivable in which it would be temporarily checked, is ultimately in a high 
degree promoted by those improvements~ and the increase of population 
tends to transfer all the benefits derived from agri cultural improvements 
to the landlords alone. " 
Mill introduces a proviso into the statement that rent does .not 
affect price: 
"Rent is not an .element in the cost of production of the commodity 
wh ich yields it; except in the case (rather conceivable than actual) in 
v1hich it results from, and r ep resents a scarcity va1 ue . " Such a concei va-
ble case he states in another place* to be this : "We can imagine a country 
so fully peopled , and with all its cultivable soil so completely occupied 
that to produce any additional qua.nt:i~ ty would require more l abor t han the 
price would feed : and i f we suppose t hi s to be t he condition of the whole 
worl d , or of a country debarred from foreign supply, then if population 
continued increasing, both the land and its produce would really rise to 
a monopoly or scarcity price." Continuing with his exception to the fact 
that rent does not enter into price, I he says: aBut when 1 and capable of 
yielding rent in agriculture is applied to some other purpose, the rent 
which it would have yielded is an element in the cost of production of t he 
commmdity whic h it is employed to produce. " 
Urban rent, Mill cl aims , is governed by principles similar to those 
determin i ng agricultural rent. Aftec stating that the rent of such land 
cannot be l ess than it would yield i f cultivated , he shows t hat one of two 
facto rs , either super ior convenience, or superior beauty and desj_rabil i ty , 
governs the amount . If the first of these f actors is paramount , then the 
~ rent is governed by the ordinary principles of economic rent, because such 
convenience, as, for instance , the possess~on of a shop on Boyleston Street , 
in Boston, is analogous ·t;o the nearness to market of economic rent . If the 
second is of chief i mportance, however , the rent i s determi ned on the prin-
ciple of monopoly entirely , and rent will be regul ated by the demand for 
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thc.;t, -part icul ar .boeat1on. 'l'.tn s O.lS"tl,nC"tlOn 1n uroan ren"Gs, nowever, appears 
to be unf ounded, as later criticism nill show. (of. Seager} * 
Mill speaks of transactions of i ndustry which are analogous to rent, 
and are governed by .the same principles. Such are patents, or any other 
exclusive privile,ges which enabl e one undertaker to put his produet on t he 
market at a less expense than is possible for any of his compet itors . Su-
perior talents for business, or superior bus iness ari.~angements Mill also 
cons i ders as comi ng in this class of t hings analogous to rent, as they 
furnish a surplus ove r the mar~ital cos t of production. These analogies 
are interest i ng , as well as the reservation in the case of price- determined 
rent, for they foreshadow the theories of the modern followers of Clark. 
Several minor points made by Mill may now be briefly examined . 
1. Rent may, in some contingencies, be obt a i ned from a commod ity even 
under the most disadvantageous circumstances of i ts production. ((But, only 
when it is, for the time, in the condition of those commod ities which are 
absol utely limited i n supply, and i s therefore selling at a scarcity value." 
Only t he app roaching exhaustion of means of product ion of s uch a comm odity 
would have this effect, however, and such a possibility is too remote to 
ent er into our calculations. 
2. Capital sunk in i mp rovements in agriculture in time becomes sub-
ject to the l aw of rent and not of profits. For example, a farmhouse 
must alnays be considered as capital~ and returns must be accord i ng , but 
money spen t in drainage, for instance , is not subject to that kind of a 
return. It soon bec omes i nd i stingu i shable from the soil, and the r etu rn 
comes in the fo rm of more produce, wh ic h in turn means higher rent~ when 
the farm is next let. 
3. In other points, Mill emphas ises points al ready brought out by 
other critics. He treat s the rent of mines much as d id MacCulloch , and he 
brings fisheries into this class of rent yielding commodities, considering 
their rent a scarcity value, in many instances. He accounted for the fact 
t hat there is no land in a country which does not yield r ent as did hi s 
predecessor , and his argument does not add any new 1 i .ght. 
One general statement in r egard to the factors governing rent made by 
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Mill is esoecially worth consideration: "It is impossible in political 
economy to obtain general theorems embracing the complications of circum-
stances which may affect the result in an individual case. The 
laws which we are enabled to lay down respecting rents. profits, wa~es~ 
prices, are only true is so far as the persons concerned are free from the 
influence of any other motives than those arising from the general circum-
stances of the case, and are guided , as to those, by t he ordinary mercan-
tile estimate of profit and loss.u 
Amasa Walker, in aThe Science of Wealth," 1866, does valuable work 
in showing the true nature of site rent . He divides rent into four ele-
ments, the first of which is location. This factor , he says~ will give 
rise to rent even if there be land of the highest grade of fertility for 
all. For suppose a number of settlers take possession of the shore of a 
lake; if there are thirteen of t hem, thirteen lots wi ll be laid out side 
by side on the water~s edge. Then it is evident that lot No. 7 will be 
the central point of that community. On it schoolhouses, churches and 
docks will be built, and from these circumstanpes the lots i mmediately 
adjoining are more desirable than those at the extremities of the row. In 
that case, such lots, regardless of the fertility which by hypothesis is 
equal for all , will yield a rent. The other factors mentioned in the 
analysis of rent are relative fertility , application of successive portions 
of capital, and increased price of importations. Under this last head, 
Walker supposes that a country cannot rai se all its supply, and t hat the 
need for grain induces importations, .which, however, are made at an in-
creased cost, and price is higher, thus affording more rent on soils pre-
viously cultivated. Walker appears to be wrong in this contention, as the 
importations are made on account of the increased price which lowers the 
margin of cultivation , and are not the cause of it. It is found cheaper to 
import grain than to raise enough from soils of i nferior quality. Thus , 
importations keep rent down, rather than raise it. 
Under the head of land appendages , Walker discusses capital applied to 
land. He does not distinguish between profits and rent, an oversight which 
leads him into error. · He asserts that buildings upon many farms are built 
for the pleasure of the ovmer, and acbordingly do not fetch as high a price 
when the farm is sold, as their cost i'Tould indicate were they built for the 
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sire of the purchaser for a certain style of dvrelling differs from that of 
the original owner, but it does not justify the conclusion*that 
"It is on the same principle t hat the amount exp ended in clea rings, 
building walls around the farms, and t he like, do not, in t he aggregate, 
• 
retur n much rent or income , compared 1with their cost . They become , in 
the progress of years, to a considerable extent,like the gifts of nature , 
gratuitous. This is true of all countries , at all times." 
This last class of objects mentioned by Walker is decidedly investment 
of capital, and mus t be regarded as such. The clearing of a farm is as 
~reat a benefit to the purchaser as it was to the original owner, and must 
accordingly be paid for . But what does happen in the progress of years is 
that the capital expended loses its character as capital and becomes merged 
in the qualities of the land for which rent is paid. Yet the capital must 
have promised a return equal to i t self, plus profits for a term of years, 
else the original investment would n~ver have been made. 
Walker also pays some attention to urban rents. These ne declares to 
depend on location alone, and explai~s the rise or fall of rent in a city 
by the movement of the comme rcial center. 
Henry Fawcett, author of"-r'Manuai of Political Economy," published in 
1869, is another writer who gives an , excellent exposition of the theory 
of rent while throwing no new light on the propositions alr eady advanced. 
I 
He considers rent as a net produce of the l and , i. e., a surplus left after 
• 
all deductions for profits and labor have been made, a new way of expressing 
the mat ter. Had he pursued this idea a little farther, as he possibly did 
in his own mind, he would have emphasized the necessary deduction of ex-
pense in marketing from this net product, and woul d in that way have corre-
lated rent from difference in fertility and rent from situation much better 
than had been done before his time. He emphasizes the fact that the law of 
rent can only bold when absolutely free competition exists, and he goes on 
I 
to discuss various factors which may lower the margin of cu.l tivation. Among 
these he numbers a possible fall in t he common rate of profits, and improve-
ments on land. 
Fawcett , while not de-veloping the idea, has added something to the 
expression of the theory by this idea of net produce which determined rent. 
If w~ consider rent as that net produce of the soil left after wages of 
labor, profits of capital, expenses of carriage and selling, have been 
deducted from the gross produce, we have a definition of economic rent 
covering all cases except those determined by a few minor factors, such as 
I 
the beautiful site mentioned by J. S. Mill. This definition will put a 
stop to all wrangling about differences in economic and site rent in the 
case of agricultural lands. 
W. S. Jevons, in his "Theory of Political Economy~" published in 
1871 , adds no new light to the theory of rent, but he expresses the law 
in mathemat ical form by methods of fluxional calculus , and for the first 
time traces the rise of rent by a diagram. In the preface to the second 
edition of this work, Jevons says: "If land which has been yielding two 
pounds per acre rent, as pasture, be ploughed up and used for raising 
wheat, must not the two pounds per acre be debited against the expenses 
of production of wheat?" This question makes Jevons the first of those 
who consider that margina~ but not differential rent, enters price ,-- a 
fact worthy of notice. 
F. A. Wal ker, in his book, "Land and its Rent," 1883, and again i n 
hisaBolitical Economy,u published in the same year, g iVles an able exposi-
tion of the economic doctrine of rent, though he ·neglects, to some extent, 
• 
rent as due to successive applications of capital , and the effect of progresE 
upon rent. His diagramatic illustration of rent as due to relative fertil-
ity and cost of transportation, however, leaves little to be desired. 
Be asserts that the doctrine assume~ that rents are determined solely 
by comp etion; and that competion is perfect. There are to his mind various 
mitigating circumstances, likely to interfere wit h the competitive deter-
minat ion of rent, and he recognizes three cases which determine the rela-
tion of actual to theoretical rents. The cases are as follows: 
uF irst - ''Wh ere, under the influence of an active competition for the 
product of industry , with all the claimants substantially on an equality 
in respect to i ntelligence, aleFtness and freedom of movement , and with no 
laws or habits or sentiments opposing the comp l ete exaction of all which 
e anything t hat is the subjeet of bargain or sale may be worth, rents, as in 
the United States, confo rm nearly to the Ricard ian formul a. 
"Second - Where, among a population presenting wide dtfferences of 
wealth and intelligence , and perhaps, also, of rank and political power, 
sent iments of personal kindliness and mutual regard between landlord and 
tenant , and a strong, aut horitative opinion throughout t he community re-
specting the obligations imposed by the ownership of proper ty, especially 
of landed property~ serve, as in England, and in many countries of t he 
continent of Europe , to reduce, in greater or less deg ree, the pressure of 
of t he l andowni ng upon the tenant cl ass ; making the l andlord slm;r to seek 
occas ions for raising, rent to it s full economic ,_ max i mum; • • by which 
it comes about the.t rent s vary widely from t he Ricardian formula , al ways on 
the side of the t enantry. 
"Third - Where, with a tenant ry i gnorant, degraded by long neglect 
or long abuse , i mp rovident, perhaps reckless in regard to fam ily increase , 
and by co.nsequence unable to offer effective resistance to an acquisitive, 
aggress ive treatment of the question of rents, little in the way of senti-
ments of personal ki ndness on the par t of landlords, and nothing in the 
way of an authoritative opinion in the favor of moderation in exercising 
the rights of property, enters to restrain the i mp ulses which tend to 
advance rents up to t he theoretical maximum, or even, as we have seen i n 
the case of Ireland, above that point , with a result of ultimate injury 
to the economic interest of both parties and of the entire community." 
According to Walker , the rent of water privileges , and of building 
lots, is regulated strictly in accordance with the principles of the 
Ricardian l aw . Especially is this the case with building lots: "Something 
• 
more is wanted in the case of building than merely ,ground to stand upon; 
the building must be placed with reference to its uses; and it is the 
productiveness of the lot in that respect that determines its rent." The 
minimum of this rent is of course the rent it would yield if applied to 
agricultural purposes . The productiveness of l and occup.ied for the purposes 
of ma.nufacture or trade , has reference to the amount of business which the 
locality affords an opportunity to secure~ or to the proximity of .water 
privileges , or of wharf-privileges, or to other facilities for doing. a 
greater amount of business with the same capital, or for saving the ex-
penditure upon a given amount of business . Such lots being limited in 
number , yet held by competing owners, their rent conforms closely to the 
Ricardian fo r mula, under the varying constructions of the word, product-
iveness." In such cases, competition more nearly approaches the economic 
ideal t han in almost any other. The rent of mines, on the contrary , is not 
regulated by Ricardo's law, without modification; the rent must be suff i-
cient to compensate for the ultimate exhaustion of the mine, which means the 
destruction of the value of t he property. 
We have now finished our exanlination of the followers of Ricardo, durin& 
t he first per iod, and the question arises , "What points have they empha-
sized, and what modifications of the orig inal theory have they made ? The 
summa ry is as follows: 
A. Amplifications of Ricardo ' s law. 
1. The law has been placed on a practical basis. 
2. The idea of site rent has been developed and correlated with 
that of agricultural rent. 
3. Emphasis has been laid 0n the fact that capital is of more 
importance in the law than is fertility. 
4. The effect of progress on rent has been carefull y analyzed . 
5. The difference between actual rent and competitive rent has 
been discussed. 
6. Emp has is has been laid on the fact that caoital lon¢ invested 
- 0 
in land is governed by the law of rent. 
7. It has been pointed out that t here i s no causal relation 
between the ri se of rent and the extension of the marg i n of cultivat ion. 
8 . It has been demonstrated t hat the absence of no-rent l and 
in a given country has no effect on the l aw . 
g. The economic dictum, "Other things equal," has been dec lared 
cf supreme i mportance i n the Ricardian l aw . 
B. Criticism of Ri cardo 7 s law. 
1. Hi s met hod and statement have been shown to be faulty • 
• 2. A distinction in the case of the rent of mines has been made, 
s i nce the law of d iminishing returns does not appl y. 
3. Provisos have been introduced into the s t at ement that rent 
does not enter pr ice. 
4 . An e;rroneo us conc ep·&ion of a monopoly rent has been advanced . 
5. An untenable theory that fertility, eo i pso , can create r ent 
has been advanced . 
2. OPPONEW.rS OF THE RICARDIAN THEORY. 
The first host il e and d estructiy·e criticism of Ricardo, i n English, 
is by a translator of Say 's ~oliticel Eoonomy , 0 . R. Prins ep, who furnish-
es an interest ing criticism of the t heory of rent, and who i s worthy of 
notic e because he wrote so soon after the publication of the aPrinciples , " 
I (1821) . Mr. Prinsep cons i ders that the chapter on rent "i s perhaps the 
least satisfactory and i ntellig i ble of the whol e work. " His argument is 
not very clear, but depends chiefl y on the f act that there are lands 
wh ich yield a rent wi t hout any labor or capital be i ng expended on them. 
He considers t hat "rent origi nates i n the union of - - util i ty , with 
diff ic ul t y of attainment , natural and artificial, and is regulated in its 
ratio by their combined intensity." This idea is evidently enalogous 
with t he monopoly theory of Say, who holds that as popul ation increases , 
all land mi ght be in product ive use, and competition between those demand-
ing fo od would push up t he price, as would be t he case wi th any other 
monopoly. 
A critic in Blackwood ' s Magazine, writing in 1827, declares that 
not only have situation and climature been utterly neglected in the theory , 
but t hat "lands of the first quality can never come first into cultivation. 
It requ ires a very ~dvanced progress in agriculture to be able to cultivate 
them. " A noteworthy criticism of the doctrine which Carey was to amplify 
ten years later! 
~ p ~h 1· n 1830 , endeavored to show the fallac-.•r of the .,: • • ___ompson , _ - y 
Ricard ian theory . He stated tha:t the fact that rent is eQual to the 
difference between the produce of two different grades of land is no 
proof that rent is caused by such difference. Also , that land may be 
uniform in fertility , and yet high rerits may be prevalent. Thompson 
considers the statement that "Rent invariably proceeds from the employ-
ment of ;;;,n additional quantity of labor with a proportionally less return" 
to be the "aborig inal fallacy of the Ricardo Theory of Rent . An addi-
tional quantity of le,bor vrill be employed because prices have risen , which 
at the same time r a ises rents, and not rents rise because more labor has 
been employed. The gratuitous and unsupported inversion of this propo-
sition is the radical defect of the whole Theory, and o:f the co.nseguences 
which depend upon it.v Thompson attac ks the Ricardian theory acridly, 
passage by passage, but as his criticism is all founded on a mis under-
standing of the fundamentals of the theory , . and a tendency to examine 
Ricardo ' s statement word by word, it is not worth the whi l e to examine 
his opinion in det a il . Anyone, by the use of Thompson ' s quotations and 
criticism, side by side , might apparently refute Ricardo , owing to his 
notorious laxity in expression. But inasmuch as Thompson does not get 
at the root of the matter at all, we may pass him by, without further 
comment . 
We come now to the examination of the work of one who is perhaps 
the most bitter opponent the theory of rent has ever had : 
Henry Carey attacked the theory in three separate publications : 
in his "Pr i nciples of Political Economy," published in 1837; in "The 
Past , the Present, and the Future,» published in 1848: and in his 
" S · 1 S · » bl "sn' ed 1"n 1R~on Im the first of aPrincipl es or oc1a c1ence, pu ·1 · · '-'-' • -
these works he copies the theory of ,Ricardo almost entirely , assailing 
. b ..< , • it paragrapn y para~rapn, in the second, he formulates the theory 
under six heads , and proceeds to show that each one of these p~:n~ts is 
faulty; in the last, he repeats mueh that he has already said in "The 
Past , the Present and the Future, " and adduces more proof of certain 
sufficiently proved statements which he made in the earlier publication. 
As it is best for our purpose to discover what his general objections 
are, and to proceed from them to the more specific , we t urn our attention 
first to the indictment i n "The Past, the Present and the Future. "~ 
After comparing the Ricardian t heory of Rent to the Mohammedan 
religion, the Ptolemaic system , and a short cloak, Carey formulates the 
doctrine under six heads , having defined rent in the Ricardian sense as 
follov1s : ((Bent is said to be paid for land of the first quality , yielding 
one hundred quarters in return for a given quantity of labor , when it be-
comes necessary, with the increase of population, to cultivate land of t he 
second quality , capable of yielding but ninety quarters in return to the 
same quantity of labor; and the amount of rent then paid for No . 1 is 
equal to the difference between their respective products. " If we make 
some pro~ision for the insert ion of rent as the difference between powers 
of production of successive invest~ents of capital into this definition, 
it will do well enough. But Carey was not so well satisfied. He ridi-
cules the idea that a man should admit "that the reason why prices are 
paid for the use of land is that soils are different in their qualities , 
when he would , at the same moment , regard it as is the highest degree 
absurd if anyone were to undertake to prove that prices are paid for oxen 
because one ox is heavier than another; that rents are paid for houses 
because some will accommodate twenty persons and others only ten; or that 
all ships command freights because some ships differ from others in their 
capacity." Carey ' s case of the ox. the house and the ship, is indeed 
abs urd, for he is drawing an analogy between the price of the use of land 
and the pr ice of the ox itself. To make the a.nalogy complete, we must 
"' P.1'7,f'f. 
read in ''the use» of the ox. In that case, the price of the use of the 
land is the difference between the return from the most productive land 
and that from land just worth cultivation, whereas the price of the use of 
the ox would be the difference between the val ue of the service of the 
strongest ox, and of that one just worth hitching up . The case of the 
house is equally worthless . It sends us back , however, to a more careful 
- examination of the statement about rent: "prices are paid for the use of 
-~ 
land" because asoils are different in their qualities." The statement i s 
false, and should read: "A priOe is paid for the use of a certa in piece 
of l and because its qualities are better than those of 1 and ,just worth 
cultivation." We now return to our analogy , and find no trouble: aA 
price i s paid for the use of a house because its accommodations are bet·Ger 
than those of a house just worth inhabiting." 
The sections of t he doctrine as formulated by Carey follow: 
''First: That in the commencement of cul tivation, when population 
is small and land consequently abundant, the best soils---those capable 
of vieldin~ the largest return, say one hundred quarters to a giv.en 
.. - . 
quantity of labor---alone are cultivated." 
This statement is sound ; Ricardo himself woul d probably have accept-
ed it as fair . It is doubtful , however, whether he would have accepted 
t he following: "It will be perceived that the whole system is based upon 
the assertion of t he existence of a singl e fact, viz., t hat in the com-
mencement of cultivation, when population is small and land consequently 
abundant , the soils capable of yielding the l argest return to any quantity 
of labor alone are cultivated . That fact exists, or it does not. If it 
ha,s no existence, the system falls to the ground." Carey proposed to show 
that the fact is not so; and in the next thirty pages he does prove that 
man has settled f irst on the hill-sides where he could manage to gather 
a small harvest from the thin soil, which required no drainage or other 
outl ay of capital beyond his means; and from there worked downward to 
the valleys, subduing richer soils as his capital and wealth increased, 
and getting greater and greater returns for the same l abor. 
Contrary to Carey 's belief, however, the whole theory does not 
depend on its historical evolution. Rent is not influenced by the margin 
of cultivation in the time of Caesar, aor yet by that of a thousand years 
from now. At any one time, it depends on the margin of that time, and 
potential , if unknown, value is of as little account as is past value. 
A sentence of Carey's asserts this f act. "If we interrogate the 
pioneer settlers why t hey waste their labor on the poor soil of the hill-
top, while fertile soils abound, their answer invariably will be found 
to be, t hat the one they can cultivate as it stands, while the other they 
cannot. '1 This is it exactly. The land which the settler cannot culti-
vate plays no part in his economic life . And accordingly, r ent in Ply-
mouth over two hundred years ago was the difference between the product 
of any given piece of land and of that piece of l and in Plymouth just 
worth cultivating , even though much richer land might be had in Virg inia, 
if the Dismal Swamp could once be drained. 
One eff ect upon the theory of rent, however , will be brought about 
by this c r iticism. Whereas , according to the Ricard i an conception , rent 
was paid on t he older land, it must now be on the newer and riche~ lands: 
as the old l ands, not the new, become the mar gin of cultivation. This is 
the meani ng of t hose abandoned farms on the hill - tops , of which Carey 
makes so much. Such farms have fallen below the ma rgin, and are hence 
abandoned. Far from showing that there is no germ of truth in the Ricar-
dian doctrine, they show that the truth is there indeed, but that the 
f o rmulation of the principle at the hands of Ricardo was not the best 
possible. 
"SecGnd: That with the progress of populati on, land becomes less 
e abundant, and t he re arises a necessity for cultivating that yieldin,g 
4- a smaller return; and that resort is then had to a second, and afteP-
wards to a third and a fourt h class of sails, yielding respectively 
ninety , eighty and se-venty quarters to the same quanai ty of labor." 
To controvert this portion of the theory, Carey is satisfied 
with shoviing that it probably is historically untrue, regardless of 
the fact that it is the margin of cul tivaticm for the present alone 
which concerns the present rent. 
"Third: That with the necessity for applying labor less pro-
ductively which thus accompanies the growth of population , rent arises: 
the owner of land No. 1, yielding one hundred quarters, being enabled 
I 
to demand and obtain in return for its use, ten quarters , when resort 
is had to those of the second quality, yielding ninety quarters; and 
twenty when No . 3 is brought into use, yielding only eighty quart ers. 
"Were all land .· of precisely equal productive power, this necessity 
could not be supposed to arise; yet compensation would still be paid 
for the use of a farm provided with buildings and enclosures, that 
would be denied the owner of one which remained in a state of nature. 
That compensation is regarded by Mr. Ricardo as being only interest 
on capital, and to be distinguished from what is paid for the use of 
the powers of the soil. When lands of different capabilities are in 
use and all equally provided with fences, houses, barns, etc., he sup-
poses the owner of No . 1 to receive the interest upon his capital, 
plus the difference between the one hundred quarters that ·i t is cap-
able of yielding, and the ninety, eighty, or seventy quarters that may 
be yielded by the soil of the lowest power that the necessities of man 
have compelled him to cultivate. This difference he holds to be true 
rent . '' 
This statement is fair . Carey ' s opinion of it is this: 
"If 7 however~ cultivation always commences on the poorer soils, 
and proceed from them to the better ones 7 the reverse course should be 
pursued; and the owner of the land first cultivated should receive 
interest minus t he difference between its powers and those of other 
lands that may , with the increase of population and wealth, be brought 
into activity with the same quantity of labor that had been expended 
upon it. If the first settler desire to let .his land to his 
new neighbor, the latter will give him , - not profits plus difference, 
but - profits minus difference. • Daily observation shows that 
such is the course of proceeding. • Th e old ship cos t a vast amount 
of l abor , but she can carry only five thousand barrels; whereas a new 
ship, capable of carrying ten thousand barrels, can be built with half 
the l abor. The owner of the first receives ~ as freight, profits minus 
the difference." 
What does this mean? Accordi ng to Ricardo , the la.nd firs t cul ti-
vated bears a rent equal to the difference between the amount of its 
oroduce and that of the land last brought into cultivation. Reversing 
this , according to Carey 's facts, the land last cul tivated must bear a 
rent equa,l to the difference between the a.mount of its produce and that 
of the land first cultivated. Rent is still as Ricardo defined it~ 
a difference in amount of produce. Carey 's idea of the effect of this 
reverse i s somewhat different . He finds that the man who first culti-
vated his land , instead of receiving the interes t from his capital, the 
bare interest which he would get according to the interpretation of 
the "reverse," above stated, get s tbat interest minus the difference 
which Ricardo calls rent. How the minus comes in, it i s difficult 
to understand; and his illustration does not expla i n. The case of the 
ship , quoted above , is taken . No figures are given to show that "the 
owner of the first receives, as freight , profits minus th e difference. u 
Supplying them, we suppose the first ship cost $20, 000; that it earned 
5% profits ; and carried 5,000 barrels. Suppose the second ship cost 
$10,000; that it carried 10 ~ 000 barrels; and inasmuch as the first 
ship earned $1000 for carry ing 5000 barrels ~ we may sqppos e ' tbis second 
ship to earn $2000. Applying Carey ' s formul a to discover what the old 
ship earns , as freight, we find this sum to be profits,* $:LOOO, minus 
t he difference between the profits of the two ships , $1000, and find 
as the net result , that "the owner of the first ship receives, as 
freight~" nothiBg! The disciple of Carey is not at liberty to contend 
that the cost of maintenance of t he old ship eats up the profits. for 
it has been all owed by Carey that the profits are clear, in the case 
of each ship , though , as a matter of fact, the cost of maintenance 
would not be so great proportionately in the large ship, the differ-
ence would be over $1000~ and the owner of the old ship would receive 
a minus quantity of money in return for his services . T'o follow 
Carey ~s line of thought, either his statement of ('profit s minus dif -
ference" means something, or it does not. The carry ing of freight 
free, or with a bonus, would seem to indicate that it does not. 
There is one more criticism which Carey makes in this section. 
He says that uif the doctrine of Mr. Ricardo is true, the selling 
pr ic e should be the capital invested, plus the value of true rent ." 
He proves very conclusively that any given tract of land will sell 
at a smal l f raction of the value of the capital which has been in-
vested in it since the time when the cave dweller scratched its sur-
face for a stone from which to make his spear. The pressing of 
this point i s another instance of Carey's juggling with words. The 
selling price is the capital invested~ plus the value of true rent, 
but by capital , we do not mean the l abor of the aboriginals , nor the 
work of Caesar 's armies . What we do mean, is capital so invested 
that it will do the purchaser some immediate good~ such as a house,or 
barn. Carey , in his interpretation of Ricardo, would make it neces-
sary , if the doctrine were to hold good, for the purchaser to pay the 
seller for any capi te,l which might have been spent in d i g,g i ng for 
d i amonds , or in any other such useless endeavor. Wh en we rememb er 
that it is onl y capital of i mmed i ate use to the purchaser, and capi-
tal over and above the minimum invested on simi l ar land of the region, 
wh ich enters into the selling price , Carey ' s utterances about Caesar 
and the Britons lose their formidable appearance. 
"Fourth : That the proportion of the landlord tends thus steadily 
to increase as the productiveness of labor increases , • • and that 
there is thus a tendency to the ultimate absorption of the whole produce 
by the ovmer of the l and , and to a steadily increasing inequality of 
condition: the power of the l aborer to consume the commodities wh ich 
he produces steadily diminishing , while that of the landowner to claim 
·-- - - ··------
them, as rent, in steadily increasing. " 
There is no "tendency to the ultimate absorpt ion of the whol e 
produce by the owner of the l and ." All t he produce which the l and-
owner can .ever absorb i s the difference between the amount .produc ed 
on the best soil~ and t hat produced on the poorest cultivated. This 
margin of cultivation presents a barrier beyond which absorption can 
never pass • The "power of the laborer to consume the commodities 
. which he produces» is also limited or, rather~ represented by this 
barrier , which can never fall to such a l ow level as Jarey would have 
us believe that Ricardo intended. 
Carey ' s attack on this part of the doctrine is based on the fact 
that the portion of the landlor·d is stead il y decreasin_g, while that of 
the laborer is steadily increasing. From this he reasons that man ' s 
power over t he soil i s increasing. There is in this , however , 
nothing incompatible with the .theory of rent, in th e light of the on e 
correction that he has succeeded in making. Rents have fallen be-
cause cultivation of richer- land has made i t possible to withdraw 
several series of t he poorer l and from cultivation, thus making the dif -
ference between the two extremes of cultivation smal ler, ~bile t he 
increase of general improvements has again tended to lower rents . 
"Fifth: That this tendency towards a diminution of the return 
of l abor, and towards an increase of the l andlo rd ' s portion , always 
exists where popolation inc reases : and mos t exists where population 
increases most rapidly: but is in a c ertain degree counteracted by 
increase of wealth , producing improvement of cultivation. " 
Carey has li t t le to say on this point . He enters a general 
e 
• 
plea for the conviction of the theory of rent because it is compl ex , 
and rei terates hi s statement about the dependence of the l aw on its 
historical evolution. 
"Sixth: That every such i mprovement tends t o r et ard the growth 
of rents , whi l e every obstacle to i mp rovement tends to increase that 
growth : and that , therefore, the interests of the landowner and 
l aborer are aJvmys opposed to ea,ch other , rents rising as l abo r :fe,lls, 
and vice versa. " 
Carey here returns to t he historical method . If , he says, the 
las t lands are less f ertile, then thi s is the case~ but if the l ast 
l ands are t he most fertile~ the revers e is true, - a statement wh i ch 
he bases on many historical ill ustrations . Be considers t hat i mprove-
ments raise rent s , .:md do not lower them. Such is indeed the case on 
• any ind iv idual piece of land, but when the i mp rovement becomes general , 
the margin of cultivation must go higher , and rents must fall . And 
even on Carey ' s t heory, the time must ultimatel y come when t he best 
l and i s all taken up , and then t he mar gin of c ul tivat ion will nec es sarily 
f all . 
The a r gument in "Past , Present and Future" constitute Carey ' s 
strongest attack upon the Ricardian theory of r ent. He also f ormul ated 
other cr i ticisms in his earlier book, "Pr i nc i ples of Political Economy , " 
bu t the fundamental i deas are ampl ified in hi s later work and it will 
not be necessar y to give more than a summary of eac h of t hes e argum ents . 
The first i s dj_rected ageinst the ste.tement of Ricar·do that r ent ·i s 
paid for t he use of the origi nal and indes t ructible powers of the l and . 
Carey i s right , here . The defini tion was badl y stat ed by Ricardo . 
Be next t akes exception to the statement that t he timber and coal - mines , 
cited b y Ade,m Smith , do not pay rent. He tries to show that the owner 
of the timber gets his rent f or the l ast fifty years in a lump sum, 
nhen t he l and is hired that the timber may be cut . He also holds that 
t he coal land i s in the same class of rent bearers as the timber, and 
gives some data about sinking a shaft t wo or th ree hundr ed feet , and 
obtaining a new "Crop" of coal , after a mine has been exhausted . I f 
t hese ideas were correct , we should expect that the rent of land would 
ri se very rapidly as t he harvest approaches , and fall very rapidly 
afte r i t has passed. When one man has planted a crop , be i t wheat or 
timber , and another man pays for i t after it has matured , i t is diffi -
cult to see how, by any stretch of the i magination, the sum paid him 
for that crop should be rent ,if the purchaser carries it away from 
the place where it grew , and profit , if the other man does it for him . 
Yet this is what Carey would have us believe. If the owner of the 
timber l and cut t he trees and sold them~ the sum paid would be profit . 
But i f the buyer cuts them himself , on this theory , it would be rent. 
Carey now e.ttacks a refer ence of Rica rdo's to e.dva,ntages of sit-
nat ion , inasmuch as he said that he was going to confine himself to the 
strict economic rent. Carey does not recognize the relation between 
site rent and agricultural rent. 
Next , he says that "No man will cul tivate No. 2 , yielding only 
ninety quarters, when he has been accustomed to receive one hundred · 
quarters for the same quantity of labor , unless wages are fal l ing.» 
He goes on to show that labor i s constantly able to secure a larger 
output of raw material, and this, he believes, i s proof of his propo-
sition. This increased output in reality , however, mer el y serves 
to show that t he margin df cultivation is moving upward , instead of 
downward . The s ent enc e just quoted, at any r at e, requir es mere proof . 
For instance , why i s it not equivalent to saying t hat because a man 
is accustomed to rec eive $5. on Monday for a given job , he will not 
take ;f,3 . for that same kind of a job , at another· )) l ace , on every other 
da y of the week, always providing t hat it is i mpossible to get the 
$5. on these other days? 
. t lltl t t . t . . t th Pass1n~ over one or wo 1mpor an cr1 ·lClsms , we come o . e 
~ 
announcement that rent cannot be foregone, because i t is the interest 
of cap ital. This is another trivial criticism; rent, to b e sure, 
is not li kel y to be foregone, but should it be once remitted , the name 
has nothing to do .with it . We come .now to the following: <' Rent is 
not pa i d because corn is high. The largest rents are paid when a 
given quantity of labor .will yield the most cern, and of course when 
that commodity is lowest . When the l abor price of corn is high , t he 
owner of the l and holds man in slavery to comf. el .him to .pay taxes 
under the na,me of rent . " In"The Past , the Present . and the Future , n 
however , Carey asser t ed that the l argest rents were paid in the 
middle a,ges when a given quantity of labor would yield the least 
corn. By the last sentence quoted, he tries to get around this 
f act by stating that this payment consisted of taxes , and not of 
r ent; if this is so , he should have preserved the difference 1n his 
later volume. · As it is , he contradicts himself . 
The remainder of the criticism in this book may be summed up 
under two heads . Either Carey insists that some quantity foreign 
to the theory itself be introduced# or he refuses to pay att ent i on 
to that greatest of economic prov i sos, "other things being equal ." 
He seemingly delights in at tacking the theory by introducing as an 
illustrat ion some specific fact which is governed by other laws, 
as well as that of rent . It is needless to multiply instances of 
this sort of exposition. 
With . , . 't il lS , the analysis of Carey ' s criticism end s . His 
as ociology " has not been examined, page by page , becaus e everything 
there mentioned is already contained in one of the other two books . 
The way of putting i t may be a littl e different , and additional 
proof of the fact that the Egypt i ans dwel t f i rst upon the hi~blands 
.t4i) 
is brought to bear, but he Aalready k~g fully presented his case in 
his earlier works . 
The argument amounts to this : 
1. All natural laws are simple. The Ricardian doctrine is com-
plex. Let us have , then , a better system based on the one f act tha.t 
the power of man over nature is constantl y i ncreasing. 
2. Ricardo was wrong from a historical standpoint. The marg in 
of cultivation tend s upward , and not downward , at the present time. 
3. The statement of the doctrine is often fault y. 
Such is the substance of Carey ' s criticism. The doctrine of rent , 
itself , has r arely been attacked, and then without success. 
After Carey, Richard Jones, who published a work on "The Distri-
bution of Wealth," in 1844, and later a "Political Economy," is the 
most vigorous assailant of the Ricardian theory of rent . His criti-
cisrr: is based on his own conception of rent, which we may first examine. 
The origin of rent, Jones claims, * is to be found in "The power of the 
earth to yield~ even to the rudest labors of mankind, more than is 
necessary for the subsistence of the cultivator himself," and this 
enables "him to pay such a tribute~" According to Jones , at an early 
period in human progress, all available land is appropriated by the 
powers that be: these powers, then, on account of their possession of 
the soil, force the laborer, - if they so desire, and regardless of anything 
like relative fertility~ - to give up all the surplus to them save a bare 
portion sufficient to maintain existence. As Jones puts it, "We come 
back then to the proposition that, in the actual progress of human 
society, rent has usually originated in the appropriation of the soil, 
at a time when the bul k of the people must cultivate it on such terms 
as they can obtain, or starve; and when their scEmty capita,! of imple-
ments, seed, etc., being utterly insufficient to secure their mainte-
nance in any other occupation than that of a,gricul ture , is chained with 
themselves to the land by an over- powering necessity. The necessity, 
then, wh ich compels them to pay rent~ it need hardly be observed , is 
wholl-y independent of any difference in the quality of the ground they 
occupy, and would not be removed were the soils all equalized." The 
histor¥ of the world is call ed upon to furnish illustration of the 
fact that land is originally i n the possession of the rulers alone~ who 
may exact tribute for its use~ and Janes considers that «The past and 
present state~ therefore, of the old and new world yields abundant 
proof of the visionary nature of those notions as to the origin of rent 
which rise on an assumption, that it is never the immedi ate result of 
cultivation; and that while the land remains unoccupied, no rent will 
be paid for the cultivated part , except such as is warranted by its 
*Bk.I, P.4 . 
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superiority over t hat part which is supposed to be open always to the 
industry of the community.» Jones now divides rent into the several 
kinds of peasant rents~ i . e. ~ rents from those using onl y their own 
l abor, and farmers ' rents , paid by a cl ass I'Ihich is partly capit al i st ic. 
The most reasonable part of Jones' critic ism rests on this doctrine 
of rent ; and when we discover the fallac y in this conception~ his crit-
icism loses its weight~ and relieves us of the necessity of examining 
i ts details . The fallac y is this : Jones does not know what economic 
rent is, yet he talks much about it . He has tal ked a.bout the t yr·an_ny 
of ancient monarchs who hold their subJects in v1hat amounted to slavery. 
What he calls rent, is not rent at all : it is a tax imposed by a des-
potic government upon a hel pless people. The failure to recognize 
this d istinction goes to the root of his discussion and makes it of 
little value. 
Jones denies flatly t he nec essity of t he law of diminishing returns. 
He considers that inasmuch as there are cases in wh icb it does not hold~ 
or seem to hold, the theo ry can have no gr eat importance anywhere ; but 
at all costs~ it must be kept out of rent . Such a cr i tici sm ~ of courseJ 
needs no answer . 
He lays emphasis on the many mi tigating circumstances which attend 
th e progress of rents , and considers these circumst~nces to be so effect-
ive as to render t he law altogether useless , except possibly in the case 
of farmers' r·ent s , which rents , however ~ he cons iders to a,ffect no more 
than one-hund redth of t he cultivated globe. Though much of this is 
worthless , there is one ci r cums tance which actually does play a con sid-
e 
-. 
er·abl e part in t he determination of rents , namely , the comparative 
immobil ity of t he laborers 7 services and capital, which has once been 
invested in the soil . Such , of course , i s t he cas e, and must often 
make the tenant satisf i ed with a smaller return to capital and labor than 
woul d otherwise be t he case; yet t his in no way invalidates the law as 
revealing t he gener-al tendency of agricultural r-ent . The inductive 
- ---------
method , which Jones adopted to the entire exclusion of the deductive , 
led him so deeply into the study of exceptions, that he lost sight 
of the law itself. 
Ricardo's most glaring error9 according to Jones, "is his tal king 
or app rovin g, others in talking, of rent as formin.g no addition to the 
national wealth, but being a transfer of value advantageous only to 
the landlords , and proportionately injurious to t he consumer. " "The 
hi gh price of corn, which determines rent," in Jones' estimation , "would 
have equally existed and been as injurious to the cons m11er, if none of 
it had gone to rent~ but it had all ~one to the consumer. " This is 
ind eed true, but emphasis upon the fact impl ies a misconstruction of 
Ricardo ' s real position. Ricardo, still in an age i nclined to belief 
in the exclusive product iveness of agriculture , was simpl y trying to 
show that rent , by whoms oever obtained, could be of no benef i t to any 
country on account of its rise or fall, but was simply an index of a 
g iven condition in agricultural l ands i n relation to consumption. Thi.s 
much criticised passage is not of much i mportance in the theory , at best, 
and if the author's most glaring error is in a passage having little bear-
ing on the matter of his text , he is to be congratulat ed rather than con-
demned. 
Wh ewell, an editor of an edition of Jones~ "Political Economy , " 
upholds Jones in his contentions, speaking at length of the f act that 
the l aw can only hold in the case of farmer' s rents, and emphasizing the 
immobility of the laborer and his capital . While expounding Jones ' 
views on this subject in an excel lent manner , he adds nothing new~ 
e and no particular examination of his doctrines is .necessary. 
-·-
H. D. MacLeod, a man who believed that "The whole practical 
importance of the question is reduced to this ,--If the landlords 
were to forego their Rents , would corn be any cheap er to t he Consumer?"--
published in 1886 a work on the aElement s of Economics , " in which he 
-· 
e 
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attacked the Ricard ian theory most vigorously, overthrew it to his own 
satisfaction, and set up another i n its stead. He believes that Ander-
son 's t heory and Ricardo 's differ essentially, and that this difference 
is suff icient to extract a,ll virtue from Ricardo's laYf. 
We may exami ne MacLeod 's criticism under the folloning heads: 
A. Of primary importance to MacLeod's mind is the above- mentioned 
difference between Anderson ' s and Ricardo 's theory, and t he deductions 
which he is able to draw· from it. He says : ('But as a question of 
Science, the theories are fundamentally distinct : fo1~ Anderson's 
theory makes the Value of Corn to be govern ed solely by Demand and Supply; 
Ricardo's t heory, by · ~uantity of Labor,' or 'Cost of Production . ' " 
MacLeod does not believe that the cost of product ion can have anything 
to do with it, and he accordingly formulates a little manual of state-
ments made by Ricardo, which be is thus able to controvert . Part of 
th e pseudo-dialogue i is quoted : 
"Now Ricardo says t hat it is the cost of producing the corn from 
this outermost zone" (of a given market, pre-supposing equal fertility 
of all soils) which regul ates the price of all the corn sold in t he 
mar ket . 
"We say it is manifestly exactly the reverse . It i s the price of 
the corn i n the market wh ich i nd icates the position of the zone. 
"Ricardo says~ •When in the progress of society land of the second 
degree of fertility i s . taken into dultivation, Ren t i mmediatel y commences 
on t hat of the first quality.' 
"We say it is exactly the reve rse, and t hat it is ,- ~hen Rent 
commences on land of the first degree ~ l and of the second degree will be 
taken into cultivation • 
"Ricardo says, •When land of the t hird quality is taken into cul -
tivation, Rent i mmediately commences on the second . 
the Rent of the first quality will rise.' 
At the same time 
"Ve say i t i s ekactl y th e reverse, and t hat it is,- Wh en i n the 
progress of Society the price of corn ri ses~ the Rents on the first 
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and second ,qualities will rise ~ and then the third quality vlill be taken 
into cultivation. 
"RI·cara·'.o say~ . ' Th l f · 1 · 
- e va ue o corn 1s regu ated by the quantity of 
Labor bestowed on its pr-oduct ion, or that quality of land, and v1i th t hat 
portion of capital, which pays no rent.' 
" We say it is exactly the re¥erse, and that - The value of corn 
indicates the worst quality of land upon which l abor may be bestowed 
without paying Rent . 
"Ricardo says, 'That corn wh ich is produc ed by the greatest 
quant ity of labor is the r egulator of the price of corn. ' 
We say it is exactly the reverse , and - That the price of corn 
i nd icates the ~reatest cost which will be employed in producing corn. " 
MacLeod ' s criticism seems to be founded on ignorance of the laws of 
normal value. Normal value , as Bullock sta,tes, * ((depends on a balancing 
of marginal utility, the force that governs demand, against the cost of 
production, the force that controls supply , and it may be said that a 
normal value is one that will tend to make production equal to con-
sumption. " Now , Ricardo , with his usual lack of precision, has spoken 
as if the cost of production alone governed the price, while he undoubt-
edly was well aware t hat the for·ces of demand must also appear in the 
price. Indeed , he i ndicates this in several passages, for example , when-
ever he mentions a rise in price as due t~ increased population. MacLeod 
however , chooses to believe that Ricardo saw but one side of the key-
stone of the arch , to use Marshall ' s figure, but he himself is willing 
to see the other side only. In any case his argument fall s to the ground , 
but Ricardo would not have hesitated to admit the force of demand in the 
price of grain had it been called to his attention. In spite of MacLeod ' s 
. ..... assurance to the contrary, the criticism does app ear to be a ((vain 
Logomachy. " 
B. MacLeod objects,t with mo re reason but with no more insight 
or sympathetic comprehens ion, to Ricardo's primary definition of rent 
as "that portion of the produce of the earth which is paid to the l and-
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lord for the use of the original and indestructible powers of the soil . 
His objection is of course valid, for the powers of the soil certainly 
are not original and indestructible. Yet what if they are not? The 
most ardent admirers of Ricardo have admitted as much , and this admission 
can make no diff erence to the theory itself . 
MacLeod also objects to Ricardo ' s attempted separation of interest 
and profits on investments in the soil from rent. He believes that as 
lon~ as the ret urn for buildings is commonly called rent , it should be 
called so in economics as wel l and a law should be found to fit it . 
He wants mines t o be _governed by the same kind of rent as anything else , 
and holds that "The fact is, that his • • • definition of Rent is purely 
arbitrary and futile . " Hardly so arbitrary or futile as are voluntary 
mis interpretations. 
c. MacLeod believes that the idea of rent arising from differences 
in fertilit~ in situa,tj_on, or in varyin_g returns to capital employed on 
the same soil is ludicrous. He supposes some avast plains of illimitable 
extent on the earth ' s surface; all of uniform fertility; wi th markets 
thickly distributed aver them so that their situation is uniform; and 
also equal amounts of Capital expended on the soil . ') He asks , uJ!Im·r in 
such a count ry as this, could not there be such a thing as Rent? 
The very statement of such a doctrine~ (as Ricardo ' s ) ui s enough to call 
forth the amazement and_ ridicule of any practical man of business ." It 
is very doubtful _whether "the man of bus i ness " would ridicule such an 
idea, but as MacLeod thinks no explanation is necessary , we must pass on 
without one. There most certainly could be no payments for the use of 
such land, unless it were monopolized by the State, in which case there 
mi ght be a tax which •· MacLeod would promptly recogn ize a,s rent . 
D. urt is very strange, " according to MacLeod~ uthat Ricardo , who 
agreed that rent does not i nflaenoe the price of corn~ maintains that 
Tithes do." MacLeod holds that t he same supply is brought to market, 
and the same demand continues; consequently the price remains the same. 
The defense of Ricardo, that the farmer , not gaining the rates of profits 
previously obtained , would go into trade until the price of grain arose , 
seems sufficient for theoretical purposes at least. 
E. MacLeod asks, when Ricardo, in quoted passages, says "that Rent 
~falls on the CQnsumer' and is cfnjurious to the Consumer,' what can he 
mean except that the payment of rent raises the Price of the Produce to 
the Consumer? Thus he exactly contradicts his previous Theory . " The 
passages quoted* will be found to be examples of Ricardo's mis- statements . 
E. s. Robertson , a writer in the University Magazine of 1879 , 
assails Ricardo on the following grounds : 
1. He ignores what Rob~rtson considers the basis of rent , the 
power of producing. 
2. Be assumes that there would be no rent if all soil were alike, 
an assumption which to Robertson~s mind is absurd . 
3. Landlords and tenants are established on soil of the first 
quality before th e second is brought into use. 
4. The difficulty of determining, the best soils a,nnul s the working 
of the lai'f. 
5. The law supposes that rent will cease to exist~ or that there 
is land forever incapable of yielding rent . This relegates the law to 
differences in relative fertility~ as time elapses. 
Having now reviewed the work of chief opponents of the Ricard ian 
Theory, we summarize their objections as fol lows : 
1. They find fault with the statement of the doctrine. 
2. They believe in an absolute power in land , productivity, which 
is able to cause rent of itself . 
3. They believe in rent as the result of a monopoly of land . 
4. They consider the complexity of the factors at work in practice 
sufficient to invalidate the work ing of the law. 
5. They insist on the immobility of l abor and capi tal . 
/ 
o. They state tha.t price i s d.etermined by demr1nci a~nd_ supply ., a.s 
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opposed to cost of production . 
7. They deny that rents arise from successive applications of 
capital . 
8. They deny th e existence of no- rent l and . 
g. They deny the validity of the law of diminishing r eturns . 
Some of the authors quoted advance one of these objections, some 
anothe r·; the ma,jor-i ty of them, however, advance the t heory that fer·-
tili ty is itself a suf ficient cause for rent • 
. B. 
FROM WALKER TO THE PRESENT. 
1. Followers of Ricardo . 
Henry Sidgwick, in his "Principles of Political Economy ," the 
second edi tion of which was publ ished in 1887, discusses the Ricardian 
t heory of rent from a critical but by no means des tructive standpoint. 
No blind follower of Ricardo , he yet accepts the main propositions of 
t he l aw of rent , admitt ing their val idi ty as resulting, from the broad 
assumpt ions upon which t hey ar e based , but ob.~jecting to tbese assumptions, 
and pointing out various force s counteracting the law. We may exam in e 
th i s r ational critici sm under the followin.g, heads ; 
A. General Criticism. 
Si dgw ick thinks* "that what is commonl y known - and widely 
accep t ed - as t he Ricardian t heory of rent comb ines in a somewhat con-
f using way at leas t three distinct t heori es , resting on different kinds 
of evidence and r el at i ng to diff erent, and not necessarily connected~ 
enquiries : we may distinguish them as (1) a historical theory as to 
the origin of rent , (2) a statical theory of the economic forces tending 
to determine r ent at the present time , and ( 3) a d9 nam ical th:eory of the 
causes continuall y tending to increase rent , as wealth and population 
increases .. Under t he fi rst of these beads , Si dgwick, after tracing 
the historical rise of rent as given by Ricardo , says: "This conjectural 
history assumes unwarrantably t hat the relative deg,rees of utility for 
agriculture possessed by different portions of t he land of a civilized 
* 1 T T f'h Y7 
coantry remains always what they originally were : i~no ri n~ (1) the 
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extent to which the labor of man has al tered the original d i fferences , 
and (2) the extent to which the economic value of l and varies , apart 
from any variat ion i n its physical conditions, in consequence of changes 
(a) in the ar t of agriculture, and (b) in the social demand for agri -
culiural produce." 
Under t he second ~ he considers that even i f the histor i cal doctrines 
were true, and we coul d distinguish betvreen the return from l abor a nd the 
powers of the soil , such a distinction would be irrelevant " wh en we are 
considering the determination of rent , as an element of the existing 
distribut ion of produce; since the price pa i d for the use of the land 
at the present time cannot be affected in any way by the extent to which 
its pr esent condi t ion i s the result of labor. Hence, while I recognize 
that ordinary agricultural r ent generally contains - besides an element 
that i s to be regarded as interest on the present value of the results 
of l abo r previously expended,- <rrrother element due to the appropr iation 
of a r a 'rY mat eria1 scat~ce in quantity , it. does not seem to me desirable 
to follow Ricardo i n restrictin~: the term rent to t he la.tter element." 
Under t he third head , discussing the proposi t ion dynam ically, or 
i n other words discussing the effect of progress on r ent , Si dg,wick adopts 
a conservative estimate. While he does not contradict the asser tions 
and prophecies of Ricardo and his followers , be deems it quite conc eiva-
ble that unre.~ard ed elements should cr·eep i nto the equati on and destroy 
its force . He admits that under the pressure of the probable increase 
of popul at ion~ the marginal cost "must some time or other be materially 
increa.sed , unless an entirely novel development should take place in the 
art of agriculture.» Yet # "For a long time to come , the pressure of 
increasing population may easily be more than counterbalanced by im-
proveru ents in agriculture and trade. And as regards increase of rent 
i n particul ar, it is not i mprobable that agricultural improvement in 
the future may partly t ake the direction either of diminish in~ the 
natural differences in t he productiveness of different k inds of land 
• 
similarly cultivated~ or of diminishing tbe differences in tbe economi-
cal value by a more careful utilization of their special adaptation 
to different kinds of qultivation. v If such were the case6 a seri es 
of fl uctue.tions would pr·obably ensue in the r·ent of . agricultural la.nd 6 
rather than the s t eady iacrease in rents predicted by Ricardo . Yet 
Si dgwick holds that there would be no corresponding fluctuations in the 
rent of urban land , but that th i s kind of property would be subjec t to 
the steady increase of rent foreseen by Ricardo • Indeed, he considers 
that Ricardo • s law of rent6 while f ormulated by the author as especially 
tenable in the case of a~ricultmral lands ~ is yet of more importance , 
and le~s subject to variat ion , in the case of urban land . 
B. Criticism of the "Mar~i n of Cult i vation. " 
Sidgwick objects to the phrase in the first place, because l and 
vioul d still yield some rent even if not cultivated , if f or instance it 
were used for a deer- park; but this object i on is overruled by pointing 
out the fact t hat such r ent of uncultivated land is dependent on situa-
tion , convenience , and desire on the part of the lessee, and is not 
governed by the marg in of cultivation at all . A more i mportant criti 
ciPm is to be found i n the fact~ as S id~wick indicates , that t he mar~in 
of cul t ivation cannot move upward or downward with equal ease. In order 
to bring new land into cultivation, an immediate retu~n for the capital 
invested in clearing , etc., must be f oreseen , while before land is thrown 
out of cultivation, there must be a read iness to throw away capital al -
ready invested . Thus we see that t he margin will move downward at some 
time after the demand f or food will warrant i t , and "\'rill not move upward 
until the farmer f a i l s t o rec eive i nte rest on the r ecurrent exp enses of 
canital invested in it . 
In reQard to success ive invest ments of capital on land, and a 
regulation of the margin of cultivation by this means~ "we often find 
the more fertile land is not cultivated up to the point at which the 
net produce per cent . of capi t al is greatest, either (1) fr om custom , 
or (2) from want of enlightenment , or (3) because the best mode of 
cul U.vation requires amounts of capital under single managements, 
larger· than avera.~. e can provide themselves, or procure by bor.rovdng." 
The utmost that can occur, according to Sidgwick , is t hat there is a 
tend ency to greater investments on l and as price ri ses , and a co rres -
nondin~ tendency to invest in other thin~s when orice f alls. Beyond 
this general rule , no statement can be made . 
C. Analysis of the effect of production on rent. 
Sidgwick very reasonably argues that the effect of production on 
-.. the ultimate value of the l and must have some effect on the rent of 
such land , an effect not regulated by the margin of cultivation. He 
1 . ' ' . ,( d ( 1 ) --i!ih . ,., ~ . . . . supposes severa causes 1n ~n1s re~ar : - \; .en lmp _ ovemcn~s 1ns~1-
toted by the farmer are for the ultimate benefit of the land . In this 
case the landlord assumes the benefit at the expirati on of the l ease, and 
no economic effect is appreciable. (2) When the outlav is not immediate-
ly orofitable to the farmer, unl ess he bas some assuranc e t hat he will 
be able to reap the gain . In t his ease, he must either be compensated 
at t he end of his lease , or the lease must be renewable, or he must be 
compensated for each investment, any of whic h plans makes the landlord 
i n reality a sharer in the management of the farm , t he last plan more 
than the others. (3) When the i mmediate advantage of the ·i;enant is 
at variance with t he ultimate benef it of the l andlord. s·u:c'h is espec-
i ally the case in mi nes. The l endlord must nuw command either a hi gher 
rent than otherwise, or be must have a royal ty on production to compensate 
him for t he deterioration of his property . 
D. Validity of the law of rent in cases other than a~ ricultural . 
These are : 
e 1, Mines; 2 , eity lots; 3. rai l roads possessing a monopol y; 
• 
4, inventions; 5, Goodwill and connexion. It will readily be seen , 
without explanation , how in the case of each of these , there is a 
surplus beyond t he expense of production, yielding a return whic h is 
analogous to, if not essentially , rent . Of course, i n the case of 
mines and urban lots , the return i s actually rent, fall ing under the 
J. R. Commons, in ~~The Distribution of Wealth, 11 published in 1893, 
considers that there are leg,al relations other tha.n those of land which 
give to their owners a surplus which should be called rent. Such are 
monopoly privileges, such as public franchises, rights of way, patent 
rights , copyrights, the good- will of a business ; in fact, all oppor-
tunities created through society by law and assigned to individuals . 
"That the law of rent," says Commons, "is capable of a wider ex-
tension than simply to landed incomes, and that not cost of production 
but earning capacity determines the v~lue of other things besides l and, 
has been perceived by various writers . But the mistake is made of 
applying this law to capital in its fixed and durable forms . 
"There is a pr actical reason why this extension should not be made , 
which does not hold in the case of thes~ opportunities, but which rather 
suggests the extension of rent to them. The problem of rent bas to do 
with the relations between landowners on the one hand , and the owners of 
capital on the other. The rent ef l and has peculiar social .significance. 
It is a share of social income which goes to a certain class. not on 
account of the share this class has had in producing that income, but on 
account of the mere ownership of the conditions for its production. This 
is the case also with the other social and legal relations. Soeiety 
creates these . relations , and not the individual producer. He merely 
occupies them as he does land, and uses them for the production and sale 
of commodities. " 
Other reasons for the distinction Commons finds in the fact that 
capital is the rent of labor and savings, and accordingly the prime 
characteristic is its cost of production. Land, on. the other hand , bas 
no cost of production, nor does it involve abstinence. and risk, as does 
capital • . Further, most surpluses of capital are due to opportunity of 
investment, and should be credited to opportunity rather than to profits 
themselves . 
.. 
In re~.ard to nrice and . rent. Commons holds that mareina.l rent is 
essentially an element in price. He says on this head: 
"The familiar dictum that rent does not form any part of the ex-
penses of production of a,gricul tural products is based upon the supposi-
tion that there i s somewhere a no~rent margin of cultivation and that 
t he expenses of production t here, being the hi ghest actual expenses in 
the product ion of agricultural goods, set the price for all agricultural 
goods . Since this land pays no rent , of course rent does not enter 
into the expenses of production. But as I hav,e already shown , there is 
no agricultural product which is raised on no- rent land . As soon as 
land is cultivated at all successfully , it yields a permanent rent, and 
this , if it be the poorest l and in use for the production of the commod-
ity in question, becomes a permanent part of the expenses of production 
of that commodity. The superior rents paid out of the same commodity 
Vi here it is produced on suoerior land are a.eain c..n additional surplus 
~ rowin~ out of the super ior advantages of such lands , and are only 
partly to be considered as expenses of production. » 
Commons ' own statement of the theory of rent is this : 
"Rent is the total surplus abovB expenses secured by t he least 
prosperous entrepreneur who continues i n business . It i s the surplus 
product on each increment of capital and labor invested above the re-
turn obtained on the marginal i ncrements . We have no difficulty in 
seeing the immediate factors upon which the size of this surplus or 
rent depends. They are: 1. The number of increments of capital and 
labor invested before the margin of utilization is reached. 2. The 
size of the surpl uses obtained on each increment before the marginal 
increment is rea.Jhed . 
"But while these factors determine immediately the amount of the 
aggregate surplus , rent, they are the secondary and not the ultimate 
factors . They themselves depend on two primary and final conditions : 
1 . The extent of the opportunities afforded by the land or the pro-
duction and sale of goods . II . The expenses of the factors of 
production. labor , capital, necessary profits , transportation. taxes , 
saJes." 
B. T. Ely published in 1894 his "Outlines of Economics , '1 in which 
he carefully elucidated the Ricardian theory of rent, but added little 
in the way of criticism which might attract attention~ A word or two 
as to his method of presentation. however, will not be out of place. 
In the first place, his reconciliation of the two elements of rent , 
..  
fertility and situation, deserve notice. This reconciliation he effects 
by saying that "Land differs in quality. that is~ in fertility , climate , 
accessibility, etc. Its quality is to be estimated by its net productiv~ 
ity or ability to put products into the market . ~Good land ' means pro-
ductive land well located . » This reconciliation is good as far as it 
goes; but it would have been better .had Ely continued on the track he 
was following, and brought urban rent, to which he pays sli~ht attention, 
under the definition, and into the reconciliation. This might easily 
have been done, .had Ely taken care to include in the virtues of quality 
other elements than those merely assisting its "net productivity, or 
ability to put products into the market ." Had he included elements , 
such as beauty and healthfulness of location. which make land desirable 
for purposes of residence, or nearness to the heart of a certain kind of 
trade , which makes it valuabl e for business purposes, his definition of 
"good land" would have been irreproachable. 
Secondly , we may notice his separation of rent of land into two 
cases, the first where there is free land which coul d be taken up, and 
the second where there is none. He agrees with the classical economists 
e 
I • 
in the f i rst case that "rent is determined by the excess of product over 
that of the best free land, " but in the second he considers that "rent is 
determined by the excess of product over the necessities of laborers as 
determined by the law of wages . " This separation of the two kinds of rent 
is of value , in that it forever silenc..es the old argument against Ricar-
do ' s law which was based on the fact that in some countries all of the 
• 
land was actually taken up. His argument in this second instance is 
based on a dia~ram used to show the results of the first . He traces 
steps of productivity gradually coming down to nothing, and shows bow, 
as demand increase~ . lower steps will be resorted to, thus increasing 
the proport ion of rent to the l'ihole produce , until it would amount to 
the total, if production were carried down to the limit. But , as he 
remarks , production can never sink to that level, for somewhere before 
that time, the produce of the land will cease to support those employed 
upon it. and it is evident that production will stop in such a case . 
Hence his distinction in the case where all land is appropriated. 
He does not consider that rent can enter into price in any instance. 
He says : "The extent of cultivation means the strength of human desires 
in this line, and determines value; when desire makes wh eat valuable 
e.uou.gh to pay for cultivating this poor land it will be cultivated , not 
before; but it is desire~ not the cultivation , which gi~en wheat its 
value . ~ This is a correct statement of the components of price , and a 
refutation of the theories of those who would make marginal rent enter 
into price. It is desire which makes the price high enough for land 
yielding a differential rent in one pursuit to be used as marginal in 
another; this marginal rent is in the price, but it is not a cause of 
the price , as that cause is human desire. 
Alfred Marshall, in his "Principles of Economics , " publ ished in 
1890 , (2nd ed . 1898 ), treats the subject of r ent at length, criticising 
and amending classical doctrines, and bringing urban rents satisfactorily 
under the laws governing economic and site rents, though treating them 
less fully t han might have been wished . His work in regard to rent 
falls under four heads: 
1. The Law of Diminishing Return . 
After defining this law, and examining its workings in detail , he 
states that Ricardo, in making his law of rent depend upon it~ confined 
his attention too much to its working in an old country~ where much of 
• 
the l abo r of man is fixed in the soil in such a day as to be indistin~u ish­
able from the gifts of nature, where the effects of t he doses of capital 
necessary to bring the land into cultivation are negligible, and where 
the tendency of the return to diminish is i mmed i ately visible. He asserts 
that account ~ should be taken of the fact that "The elasticity of nature~s 
return to capital and labor varies with soil and crops , and that "the rel a-
tive f ertility of two fields may change with circumstances,v such as 
successive investment of capital in equal amounts on each, or the intro-
duct ion of improvements, or a change in the character and number of the 
population . He introduces here the fact of Carey, that settlers do not 
settle at once on what are finally the best lands, and i n reply to this 
states that fertility is rel ative to time and place. 
He further criticises Ricardo ' s wording of the law as inexact. He 
considers, however , that "There are strong reasons for holding that he 
he.d not overlooked the conditions which were necessary to make the l aw 
true; he seems here, as elsewhere, to have made tbe great error· of 
taking it for granted that his readers would supply those conditions 
whicb were present in his own mind .v And be quotes approvin~ly from 
fi.oscher ~' : ~In ,jude ine Ricardo _. it must not be forgotten that it was not 
his intention to write a text-book on the science cf Political illconomy, 
but only to communicate to those versed in it the result of his researches 
in as brief a manner as poss ibl e. Hence he writes so fre quently making 
certain assumpt ions, and his words are to be extended to other cases only 
after due consideration , or rather re-written to suit the chan~ed case." 
The summary of his reasoning as to the outcome of his defect is this: 
"Ricardo said that the richest land s were cultivated first; this is 
true in the sense in which he meant it: but it is apt t o -be misunder-
stood, as it was by Carey • But Carey has shown that Ricardo underrated 
the indirect advantages wh ich a dense population offer to agriculture." 
He says further, in extending the l aw of diminishing returns, that 
a mine does not, strictly speaking, yield diminishing returns, for the 
produce of the mine , in di st i nct ion from the produce of tbe soil, i s part 
of the mine itself; and therefore~ a lar ge part of what i s pa id for 
the use of the mi ne is royalty , and not rent . In t he case of buil dings , 
however· , the 'r'lork i ng, of t he l aw of di mi nish i ng retur·ns is evident , a,s 
there is a dist inct d iminishin~ of convenienc e, as success iVe bapital 
i s employed~ for instance , in buil di ng storey after s t or ey , there must 
be a mar~inal storey , beyond which it is not profita ble to build . 
B. The Theory of Economic Rent , Proper. 
Under this head , Marshall comm ences with a definition of the two 
classical doctrines inherent in rent. These he states to be : . (' that 
the pric e of t he whole produce is ~~~~£!!~~~ by the expenses . or money 
co st , of prod uction on the marg in of cultivation; and that rent does 
not ~g·~~£-l£~2 cost of production." With refer ence to these doctrines, 
he as serts that three cautions are necessary in t heir interpretat ion : 
arn the first place, Rent is here taken as another name for the 
s urpl us produce v1hich i s a,n exce.ss of what i s required to remunerate 
the cultivator for his cap ital and l abor; and i f th e cult ivator owns 
the land himself , he of course r etains this surplus . 
aNext , t he marginal application of capital and labour , by th e r eturn 
to wh ich we estimate the amount reau ired to remunerate the farmer , is not 
nec essaril y aopli ed to i nferior land; it is on t he margin of profitable 
expend i ture on land of any quality . 
"Lastly , the doctrines do no t mean that a tenant farmer need not 
take his r ent into account wh~n making up his year Js balance sheet . 
When he is doing that , he must count his rent just i n t he same way as 
he does any other expense. What they do mean is that , when the farmer 
i s doubting wh ether· i t is v,rorth hi s whi l e t o apply more capital and 
e l abour to the land, then he need not think of his rent; f or he will 
~• have t o pay this same rent whether he appl ies this extra c apital and labor, 
or not . Therefore , i f t he marginal produce due to th i s additional outl ay 
seems likely to give him normal prof its ; be applies it: and hi s r ent 
does not then enter into his calculations . " 
Hav i ng in mi nd these cautions , he proceeds to a restatement of t he 
classical doctrines: 
"(1) The amount of produce raised , and therefore the position of 
the marg in of cultivation (i . e., the marg i n of t he profitable application 
of capital and labor to good and bad land alike) are both governed by the 
general condi t ions Df demand and supply . They are governed on the on e 
hand by demand : that is, by t he number s of the population wbo consume 
the produce, the intens i ty ~f their need for it, and their means of pay-
ing for it ; on the other hand by suppl y; that i s , by the extent and 
""e- fertilit y of the available land , and the numbers and resources of those 
ready to cultivate it. Thus , cost of production , eagerness of demand , 
mar gin of product ion and price of the prodrice mutually govern one another; 
and no circular reasoning is involved in sp eakin~ of any one as in part 
governed by t he others . 
" (2) But rent takes no part in controlli n~ the ~eneral conditions 
of demand and supply, or t heir relations to one another. It is governed 
by the fertility of l and , the price of the produc e, and the produce of 
the mar~ in: it is the excess of the value of the total returns which 
capital and l abor applied to l and do obtain, over those ~hich t hey would 
have obtained under circumstances as unfavo rable as thos e on the margin 
of cul ti vat ion. 
"( 3) Therefore , i f the cost of production i s estimat ed for part s of 
the produce whic h do not come from the_ margin (a c ha r ge of rent being of 
cours e entered in this es t i mate) , and if this es timate i s used i n an 
account of the causes which govern the price of t he produce , then t he 
reasoni ng i s circular. For that .whidh is wholly an effect i s reckoned 
up as part of the cause of those thin~s of which it i s an eff ect . 
"(4) The cost of produ6tion of the mar~inal produce .can be ascer-
~1ft: . ta.ined wi thout reasoning in a circle. The cost of pr-oduction of other 
parts cannot . The cost of production on the mar gi n of the profitable 
applicat i on of capital and l abour is that t o wh ich the pr ice of the 
whole produce tends , under th e control of the general conditi ons of 
demand and suppl y. " 
In a note on this exposition, Marshall asserts that "This method 
of treating the rent of land may be supplemented by another, proceeding 
rather on Cournot's plan of starting with value as determined by a monop-
oly , and then introdu6ing the competition of many rivals , so as to work 
towards the circums tances of a free market . n This plan he illustrates 
by the use of mineral sp ~ings, showing that the rent will be the exc ess 
over the expense of working them, and pr ice would be governed by demand 
and supply. · 
-.. Summarizing his results, he says : '(Thus, difference in the rent 
(or producer•s surplus} of land results from difference in its net 
advantages~ account being t aken both of its situation and its fertility; 
but all that is required for the existence of rent i s t hat different 
par·ts o~ the produce should be raised under different advantages , that 
is, at di fferent costs . Rent would exist even if all land were equally 
advantageous, provided only that the population were just a little more 
than sufficient to bring it under cultivation. On the outskirts of a 
new co•unt r y, . v1here some of the best land still remains uncultivated and 
free to t he first comer, there is no rent . " 
The class ical economists have treated rent as a single commodity , 
whereas it is in fact the aggregate of innumerable crops . Th e classical 
economists, follov:ing the lead of Ricardo, have rea.scned as if all l{inds 
cf produce could be converted into corn, and therefore no account need 
be taken of them. But t here are some minor effects deserving notice. 
"Only a part of the land and of the resources of t he cultivators 
are available f or any one c rop , say oats or hops . » Each strives against 
the rest for t he possession of the soil, and the one proving most re-
munerative is most cultivated, though several obstacles to "substitution~ 
~ - such as habit, or ignorance, may hinder this result . Yet it will be 
general ly true that each cultivator , " tak ing account of his own means~ 
will push t he i nvestment of capital in his business in each several 
direct ion until what appears~ in his judgment , to be the margin of 
profitableness is reached; that is , until there seems to him no good 
reason for thinking that the gains resultin,g. from eny r-urt.ner ~n~~..­
ment in that particular direction vmuld compe-nsate him for his outl ay . • 
Thus, i n equilibrium, oats and hops and every other c rop will yield the 
same net return to t hat outl ay of capital and l abour·, wh ich the cul ti-
vator is only just i nduced to appl y." 
On account of the compet i on of l and for t he di fferent c rops , t his 
amended doctrine must be modified, and"the marg,in of cultivation has 
now to be descri bed as the mar~ in of profitabl e aonlicat ion of capital 
and l abour to all land whi ch the competion of other c rops yields to oats." 
"That i s to · say, the statement that the normal value of oats i s deter-
mi ned by t heir production under the most unf avor·able circumstances under 
wh i ch they are grown, needs to be completed by adding : firstly , that 
these circumstances are , no less t han the nor·mal v.alue i tself , governed 
by the ~eneral condi tions of demand and supply; and secondly, that one 
of the chi ef of these conditions is the amount of l and \'lhich is capable 
of growing oats , but for which t here i s so great a demand for other 
purposes that it affords a higher rent , when used for them, than when 
used for growing oat s . For the expenses of product i on of t hose oats , 
which onl y just pay their way , are increased by the diversion to other 
crops of land wh i ch woul d return large crops of oats,--lend which would 
yiel d a good r ent unde r th~m , but which yiel ds a better r ent under 
other crops . It i s still true that rent i s not an element in those 
expenses of marg inal oats, to wh ich the price of the wh ol e conforms . 
But the ph rase 1 r ent does not enter int o the cost of production ' when 
appli ed to a particular crop , such as oats , is especiall y liable to 
mi s i nterpret at i on , and it should be avoided . v 
This exposition conta i ns no refe r ence t o the nature of the commod-
i ti es r a i sed on the la,nd , and as Marshall assures us, t he argument is 
equall y valid on that account for urban as for rural land. He adds 
at t.b.e end of the chapter a note on severa.l pecul iarities of urban 
rents, which he summar i zes as follows : uThe l imitat ions wh j_ch make 
the d6ctr i ne that rent does not enter into cost true of agr icul tural 
rents are sufficient to make it true of urban rents . The "mar~in of 
buildingn in urban rent corresponds to the margin of cultivation in 
rural rent . "Additional rooms on the margin of building pay no rent. 
The indirect effect of rent on expenses of production must oot be over-
looked either in manufacture or in agriculture. " It is not necessary 
to analyze this note more carefnlly , as the argument is in each case a 
duplicate of that used in discussing rural rents, thouQh the conditions, 
of course, are slightly different . 
c. Quasi-Rent, or Income from an Application for Production already 
made by Man.·· 
This income Marshall terms Quasi - Rent , ({partly because we shall find 
when we are consideving periods of time too short to enable t he supply 
of such appliances to respond to a change in the demand for them , the 
stock of them has to be regarded as temporarily fixed . For t he time 
they hold nearly the same relation to the price of the things which 
t hey take part in producing as is held by land, or any other free gift 
of nature , of which the stock ·is permanent ly fixed; and whose net 
income is a true rent.» The fact that. the supply of the se appliances 
is not permanently fixed is what gives rise to the justification of 
t heir tree,tment under another head than that of rent i tself , and the 
element of time required to chan_ge the supply in confor·mi ty to the de-
mand may be said to lie at the root of the whole matter. There is 
unlikeness b et Ne~h land and these appliances made by man~ because land 
is fixed stock for all time, wherea.s the appliances are a flow , capa-
ble of being retarded or hastened according to variations in demand~ and 
there is likeness, because these appliances can be regarded as a fixed 
e stock for short periods. There is no need to chrell on this distinction 
of Marshall ~s , for while it clears up many errors of past writers , it 
does not affect the theory of rent itself . One illustrati on of the 
princ i ple will suffice: «The income from meteoric stones may be true 
rent , if their number canno-t be increa.sed.; a tax on it then falls on 
the owners. But if the supply can be increased slowly, the income re-
sembles a rent only for short ~eriods. If it can be increased quickly 
the income is an ordinary profit except for very short periods ." 
D. Situation and Compos i te Rents . 
Marshall treats in a following chapter* of rents due to situation, 
and also of those rents which have in t hem two or more component ele-
ments . There is no reel criticism or add ition to the theory of rent 
in this chapter, and attention is called to it simply to show that 
Ma rshall has .not negl~cted this side of the theory . We may pass over 
his a.ccount of situation rents with the remark that it is orthodox, 
and glance at what he terms composite rents. Such may be t he rent fro m 
a buil d i n~ and from the ground on which it , stands. paid in one sum, but 
really consisting of the quasi-rent from the building and the ground rent 
for the land. Or natural advantages may make the rent composite, as in 
the case of a mill situat ed on the .shore of a stream: the rent here is 
for s ite , for the water and for the quasi-rent of the mill . But though 
such instances may often present difficulties in practice, when the 
owners of each agent are different persons, there is little theoretical 
signi ficance i n this distinction, beyond what is conducive to clearness 
of thought . 
Marshall has also an article "On Rent» in the Economic Journal for 
March. 1893, in which he re-states and emphasizes the principles laid 
down in his ('Economics." He i s especially emphatic on the subject of 
time as the chief cause of the difference between rent and quasi -rent, 
and also dwell s on the producer ' s surplus of .which rent is the leadinQ 
- 'J 
factor . · The article is intended~ hovrever , as a defense against the 
attacks of the Duke of Argull , rather than as an expositicn of principles 
e other than those contained in his longer wor ks . Accordingly, it need not 
be examined in deta il. · 
J . S. Nicholson~ in his "Tenant's Loss not Landlord ' s Gain ,» 1883, 
bas a chapter devoted to the Ricardian theory of rent , in which , while 
admitting much of the theoretical truth of the doctr:i.ne, he attacks it 
on practical grounds . Though it is .not elaborated t i ll near the ena of 
the chapter , we may fir st examine Nicholson '.s theme, that. "Rica.rdo' s 
•' 1 · t_·ne d ,_.fferen_ces in rents at any_ time, but fails to c.neory exp_alns  
account for the i ncrease of rent in the past . and its probable increase 
in th e f'ntnre.n Be holds that Ricardo is both historically and logi-
cally wrong when he consider s that it is the constant pressure of pop-
ulation on the means of subsistence which makes it necessar y to resort 
to inferior lands ~ or to lower the mar~in of extensive cultivation. 
To Ni cholson ' s mi nd , Ricardo has not observed the actual progress of 
rent i n this regard , and further than that, he bas confused cause and 
effect. Accord i ng to Nicholson, soils are cul tivated by i mp roved 
methods, and an increased population on that accoun t becomes possible , 
i • . e ~ , population fel lews the marg in of cultivation rather t han vic e 
versa . Historically, he adduces enough proof to show t hat the rise of 
rent i s not always a consequence of increased population, but log ically 
the idea that popul at ion depends on cultivation does not seem tenable. 
In this account of t he progress of rent, Nicholson t akes except ion 
to Rica rdo's view of t he effect of improvements on rent . He admits 
that rents mi~bt fall , but be asserts, without proof. that the l andlords ' 
rents would finally rise to what they were before; Thi s is said in crit-
icism and correction of Ricardo~ yet it is what Ricardo says himself ; 
so the reason f6r its int roduction is doubtful . At any rate, Nic hol son 
considers that "this leads us to observe that the main cause of the 
increase of the landlords ' rent • · • · • is the increase of agricultural 
s k ill~ and the embodiment of permanent improvements in the soil, and not 
t he resort to inferior soil nor the diminishing return per uni t of cap-
i tal.'' Yet are not the increase of skill and the per manent i mprove-
ments the very t hings which enable the possessor of the skill to ob-
tain common profits from a poorer piece of land than was before culti-
yated , and th e own er of the i mp roved land to obtain a greater surplus 
over marginal l and ,-things which in both cases are equivalent to a rise 
of rent? If thi~ is so, the criticism of Nicholson amounts to little 
more than an assertion t hat price limits population, rather than vice 
versa, as is taught by the Ricard i an school . Yet Ricardo admits that 
anything causing a fall in price will i ncrease population , and Ni cholson 
has endeavored to amend the law of rent by emphasis of a po int which is 
really embodied in it. · 
Having disposed of the chief element of Nichelson's c riticism ~ we 
may gl ance at his minor poi nts. He considers rent to be composed of 
elements of fertility, location~ including proxi mi ty and climatic con-
ditions , and capital . The first two factors fie accepts i n the usual 
sense, but criticizes the classic · ~xposition of the successive applica-
tions of capital on the ground that the agr i culturalist is practically 
not at liberty to invest capital remaining aft~r the marginal capital 
has been reached , i n any other business , and wi ll accordingl y invest 
it in agriculture as long as be can obtain a sum above the ba~e in-
terest . This Nichol son claims i s surely the case when the l and is 
cultivated by its owner, and must be t he case i f the land is let, 
unl ess the l andlord has some means of det ermi ning the ~mount of capital 
~ ! 
wh ich the tenant may invest. Yet in real ity, this fact does not enter 
i nto the law of rent. The l aw is formulated on that greatest of eco-
nomic provisos, "other thin~s being eoual,"-- a proviso wh ich in this 
case is not operative; and accordingly, rent may affect the f a rmer, 
as Nicholson claims , but it affects him solely because of inability 
to invest capital , an incident which cannot affect the general law. 
Nicholson claims that other "reasons may be giv en to prove that 
for land to yield a maximum rent may be to the advantage neither of 
the f armer no r of the public . a . The kind of pr oduce i s f i xed i n 
the interests of the l andlord, for instance, grazing land may yield a 
hi gher rent tl:).an arable , yet it would be to th-e interest of tl1e public 
were the greater amount of caD i tal and labor invested in the arable . 
b. The landlord is supposed to divide the land in such a way as tm 
obtain a maxi mum rent." It may , then, be in his interest to drive cut 
the small tenant ; but such is not the i nterest of t he community: 
('l t. r . d-. "-.;; ~r·e r-t,_.l )-_J;;m . " 
·_a -liUD . 1 a peraluc' o ~ 
Nicholson claims in summary that the "theory assumes that the 
m"'lnt o·_f' caD,_ ita1 ap_u_lied to l a nd, the kind of produce, and the size 8. ~ L-
of the holdings, are all determined by the landlord with the view of 
securing the maximum of produce. " To thes e assumptions be ob,jeots , 
cl eim i ng that various details enter which obviate them, and in turn 
lessen the value of the law; a criticism which amounts to the state-
ment that the law is too theoretical, and that its practical working 
is often determined by causes other than the general lclw . Such is all 
that this secondary crit ic ism of Nicholson amounts to . 
In his "Principl es of Political Economy , "s Nicholson takes up other 
• I· f n .I. • -" t' .J , n ' n ll • • d -'- h ' , poln·Gs a· · r ec t.ln~ 11e cneory oi rem; , r a 1ng un er (; r·ee neao.s : 
A. Economic and Monopol y Rent. 
Nicholson considerst that there are three essentials in rent: land, 
a ~ift of nature, but limited in quantity and appropriated; a differ-
ential profit; permanence of this profit . 
Be now supposes that all l and is equally fertile, well situated, 
and t hat t he lan of diminishing returns is not operative. There will be 
a rent , he says~ if the produce sells so as to give mo r e than ordinary 
profits. And t his rent will be an economic, not a monopoly rent, for 
the three requisites of economic rent are present , and a monopoly, to 
his mind ~ is determined not by limitat ion of supply, but by absence of 
competition. If , on the other hand , all l and were in the hands of one 
owner, the rent would be essentially mon-o-pol ist. ic. 
It seems in this case, that the supposition of permanently hig.he.r 
profits in agdculture than in other enterprises is impossible , and for 
e this reason : If such land as he describes is unlimited, every new 
. , entrepreneur wil1 wish to go int o agriculture, until tbere is such a, _glut 
of a~ricu1tural produce that the prices of other commod iti es would be 
" ' . t" o...t 1 1 . 0 t . d d , rorceo. u.p 'to n~ _eve_ 1n oro.er o 1n ·nee anyone to un .er·taKe their 
production , or the or-ice of agricultural produce would fall~ owing to 
competition among farmers . Probably both results would be manifested. 
* Vol . I , 1 893 , Vol.TI, 1B97 , Vol . III,1901 . 
• 
If, on the othe r hand, the supply was limited, the only th11 g tnac wou .a 
happen would be an inc r eased capitalized value of the land . If interest 
(and profits) on an investment of $10 ,000 in menufactures was 10% and in 
. , ""· ?0.-.~ e.g r lC UJ. uur·e _ iu , when th e farm next sold it would be valued at $20 , 000 
instead of $10 , 000 , thus mechanically adjusting profits in all undertakings 
in &. fevi years . Hence this l and of economic r ent proposed by Nicholson 
is impossible . 
B. The doc t rine of Quasi- Rent . 
To this doctrine Nicholson objects on t he ground t hat only one of 
the reqrisites for rent, a differential profit, is present . «Pushed 
to its lo~ical extreme , the doctrine of quasi - rents amounts to saying 
that the difference betv1een the market price of anything and. the normal 
price is an unstable profit, which it will take a lon~er or shorter time 
to redress ~ Th is contention appear s just , and indicates that there 1s 
little pr actical utility in ~arshall's theory . * 
0 . Rent and Price. 
After :~ or:n ul ct i n2, for c;,g,r·iculture.l lend the Ric:ardie.n conce9t i on 
t tat rent does not enter into price, Nicholson makes the following ex-
c ept. 1ons : 
1. If land i s used for purposes other than agricultural, "there 
. , ] WlJ.. . be so muc h less available for agriculture, and conseQuently the 
mar ~in i s pushed out, or there is intensive cultivation, and therefore 
the price of agricultu ral produc e will rise . The real cause of the rise 
11 r"''4 ttL is that rent~ for· some ~ of ,.. l end , and th is r ent , being pa id for dif -
ferential natural conditions, is an economic rent . » There seems to be 
here in embryo the conception of marginal rent as price determining of 
Cl erk, Fetter , and tbe rest . It seems, however, to overlook t he fact 
t bet price is essentially dete~mined by desire as well as cost of pro-
duct ion , and that this desire, were it sufficiently strong, would turn 
the deer- parks i nto corn- lands . It is merely a matter of the relative 
desi r abili ty of tbe t wo. 
2. The next case i s t hat of th e instance wtere all doses of capi -
* ~ ar shall : Principles of Economics, Boo k V,Ch.IX. 
tal gave equal returns, and equal fertility and location were also present 
with relative scarcity. n 1- 1 • ,., , • n ""-' ~ • 1 .• • ed riere , lle c al mS~ T,Dcn; li uDe proo.uce yleJ.Cl~
mo re than a common rate of profit ~ this extra prof i t must be part of cost , 
as comp etition precludes t he i dea 6f monopol y. But the cas e supposed 
a,ppears _to be i mpossible for t he reasons stated aboye . 
3. If the land suitable for agriculture i s used for manufactures, 
the rent it would have yielded as f arm land must enter into the cost of 
t he manufactures, and indirectl y r a is e t he price of other farm produce 
by withdrawing the l and from that use. Not at al l ; the rent paid is 
no t agricultural rent plus some more for site. It is site r ent al one, 
and t he agricultural r ent plays no part whatever. 
A. T. Hadley , in his "Economics~" published in 1900 , devotes little 
space to the discuss ion of r ent , treating it i n a chapter of Profit s . 
He considers t ha t the exigencies of mode rn bus iness are such as t o ob-
viat e i ts working in pr act ice tho ugh he adm i ts that i t has some value 
as pure t heory . He considers economic r ent as the different i al gai ns due 
to advantages of location, and defines rent as any permanent excess of 
the rate of profit over the r ate of i nterest , wh i ch he considers as chief-
ly due to fores i ght i n investment. He considers that the di fferent i al 
gain s in rent are offset by differential losses, which in some instances 
more than neutralize the gains, and that " Whil e t here are many farms that 
a re worth mo r e than the cap i tal inves t ed i n them, th ere are also many 
wh ich are worth l~ss . » To this , of course, it mi gh t be replied that no 
farm i s worth al l that has been i nvested i n it f ~om the very beginni ng , 
and that after a t i me return to original capi tal i s merged i n r ent ; also 
that rent cannot be expected to bear the brunt of mistaken i nves t ment . 
Hadley , however , persists in the i dea of a negat ive rent , which he con-
s i ders to justify the present i ndustrial system and to furnish a r eply 
to Henry Georg.e , as r ent i s in t hat case a compe,nsation for risk. He 
believes that the prevail i ng theory of economic rent i gnor es the extent 
of the lo sses . "It assumes that future pric es can be foreseen wi th a 
considerable degree of accuracy. It assumes th at the margiDal laborer 
and the mapg,ina1 unit of capital do i n fact contribute to the product 
an a,mount equal to the valuation placed on their services . But this is 
notoriously untrue . The marginal laborer is often employed at a rate 
r. ' ' h • ' or wages Y/.plCl1 exceeds the total amount that the consumer ever pays for 
the product of hi s l abor. The marg i nal unit of capital receives a return 
i n the form of iBterest which is often decidedly in excess of the ad-
vantage which the speculat or de rives from i ts use . If the product of 
..  such l abor and capital were i mmediatel y available for consumpt i on, such 
mistakes would not be made; but as matters at present stand, they are 
always being made on a small scal e , and often on a large one. These 
mi stakes are likely to continue as long as we have industrial progress ." 
Ricardo , he considers , was a.ware of these mistakes , but assumed 
the.~ could be quickly rectified , and that by withdrawing capital from 
unprofitable bus iness and investing it in profitable, the balance would 
be held. The cause of this mi sjudgment on the part of Ricardo , Hadley 
regards as the industrial conditions of hi s time, notably the large 
number of small producers , and the fact that Ricardo was a banker , an 
occupati6n in which capi tal is readi l y shifted from one i nvestment to 
another . "But modern capital i s not ordinarily invested in such forms 
that it can be readily withd r awn or transferred from an unprofitable 
us e. " "It is not true , as Ricardo assumes, that the normal price of 
wheat just remunerates the last produce , and that any f armer for whom 
it fails to be L"emuner;;.tive can speedily wi ttdraw from the market . '' And 
before he will withd r aw , ther e will be di fferences of disadvantage as 
v;ell as of advantage , for·min g the negative rent of which ment ion has been 
made above . Hadley believes that Carey was not so far wrong after all, 
when he emphasized the i nfluence of new settlers on the value of the land . 
T. N. Carver , i n hi s book on the "Distribut io n of Weal th ," follows 
other present-day economists i n their expos i t i on of rent, allowing him-
self to be gu i ded by the fundamental principles of the Ricardian theory 
c.s now accept~ea~ and turni ng his originality to ilTiistra:tlon . 'l'l1er·e are """ 
one Ol' tv1o points made by hi m v;h ich ma.y be mentj_oned _. but none which deTG.a.nd l 
careful attention on account of their bearing on the theory of rent . 
First , his explanation of the fact , already long established, that there 
need be no diffe rence in fertility to account for the presence of r ent , 
i s of value . He asserts , wi th reason , that as soon as the l aw of dimin-
i...-hing r eturns manif ests i tself , r ent must • appear; this fact i s, of 
course , self-evident , and requires no explanation in the light of modern 
criticism. Another ooint worthy of notice is his champ io nsh i p of the 
landlord class , who , he says , provide against dete rioration of l and and 
property actuated by mot ives of self-i riterest ,--a much more potent factor 
t~an ~overnruent supervision . Lastl y , we ma y note his statement that the 
rent of dY1ell:i ng pl aces , a nd other l ands used for· amusements only , is 
determi ned by the l aws of ma r~ inal utility only , and i s r egulat ed like 
any other consumer ' s good . This , however , appears l ess s at i sfactory 
than the explanat i on of Seager. 
Henry R. Seager, i n his «principl es of Econom i cs ," publi shed in 
1904, ~ives an excellent exposition cf the theory of rent , primar il y 
fr om the s i de of site r ent, t o wh ich , in his opinion , suf fic i ent atten-
tion has not been na id . In this explanation , he drans severBl conc6Iltric 
circles , as follows : 
e 
• This he supposes to be t he available land in a given city . Land 
in the situation A wi l l be used for business purposes , E for residential , 
C f or truck farm i ng , 0 for wheat , E for g r azing , and F will be us eless 
for any pu r pose , i . e., i t will be absolutely no - rent land. Now, be-
gi nning with the ~razing land, though as a matte r of fact Seager beg i ns 
with the business land, we see that some cf it approaches the no-rent 
l and, while some, that nearest the area D, will pay a rent amount i ng 
to th e difference between what it can croduce and market and what is 
raised on the border of th e no-rent land . Her e , of cou r se, fertility 
counts for much . As soon as that ferti lity , together with situation, 
oassas t he line dividin~ D and E, it becomes profitable t o rai se wheat 
and we find that wheat is raised in a rea D. But some of this land 
af f ords a surplus over what barely justif i es the raising of wheat, and 
accordingly we have a rent in the wh eat land, some paying more than 
others , o w in~ to difference in fertil ity and s ituation; but all the l and 
i n this belt must yield rent, o~ it would be turned i nto gr azing land in 
wh ich capacity it coul d , by hypothesis , yiel d rent . And so with the belt 
devoted to ma r ket garden in ~ . Si tuation now becomes as i mportant as 
fert ility, for per ishable vegetabl es must be rai sed near the city . On 
th i s land the r e will be a di ff erential re nt between the worst l and so 
empl oyed and the best , but the marginal rent wil l r emain permanen t l y 
above that paid by the best wheat f i elds , or it would be converted int o 
them. The situation of the best market gar dens is so near the city 
t hat t hey would be demanded for resid ential bnrposes , if over the line 
between C and E. And when this i s t he case, the land wil l command a 
greater rent as used for building than for gardening, owing t o the demand 
that r esidences shall be near to pl aces of business, wh i ch , of cou rse , 
a r e in t he centr e . Here ,value , on account of fert ility, d i sappears ; but 
value , on account of pl easen t ness of surroundings c;,nd faciliti es otber 
then those of communication with pl ace of bus iness , t ake i ts pl ace . I n 
this belt , the differential and the marginal rent also holds good . 
Fi nally we come to t he bus i ness section of t he c'ty , which appears as 
soon as l and is more valuabl e on account of i ts s ituatio~ for bus iness 
pu r poses t han it is convenient for those of residence. This , then , i s 
the fi nal ar ea , A, and the l and in i t command ing the highest rent is 
exactly in the centre , other things bei ng equal . 
Seage r gives a good s ummary of the d ifference betneen di fferent i al 
and ma r·ginal rents , wllic.h may be easily understood. atter the r·oreg6iilg ....... 
explanation. 
"Marginal l and , for some of t he uses to which land is put , is actually 
no-rent l and . More commonly the mar ginal l and for any particular us e 
itsel f af f ords a rent . Though marginal for the gi ven use , it is above the 
margi n of some other use to which it might be applied. Rent is thus dom-
posed usually of a diff erential and of a mar~ inal el ement . The former i s 
an expens e of product i on only to entrepreneurs usi ng superior l and for 
the given pur pos e , but the l atter must be paid by all entrepreneurs en-
gaged in the given branch of production and hence figu ~e s as an element 
in the normal expense of production." 
Th is i dea of mar gi nal and di fferent i al rent was ably di scussed 
ten years before , by J . H. Hollander , in a discussion of aThe Concept 
of Ma rg inal Rent . "* Ee says : "To be retained 1n the fir s t use , it 
(l and) must yield a •marginal rent' equivalent to that which it would 
pay i f devot ed to the second use . This rent enters directly i nto th e 
cost of th e marginal product , and both in method of determination and 
in r elation to normal cost is distinguished from differential rent." 
Seager has well illustrated the idea diag ramaticall y, as f ollows : 
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Letters enclosed in parentheses indicate corresponding letters in 
the previous diagram, and the rhomboidal areas they mark are the belts 
of that diagram. 
The parallelogram RBCO = the total produce falling to the share 
of wages, interest~ and profit, the horizontal line RB markin~ their 
limit in each section. 
The lineAL represents the differential rent of land (E), when 
B pays no rent, and also the margi nal rent of land (D). 
The line IM, by the same principle, represents the marginal rent 
of land (C) and, subt~acting from it XM (equals AL), the differential 
rent of land (D). 
The rents of the other grades of land are similarly indicated, 
the small triangles in each case representing the total differential 
rent of each grade, and the rhombo i d above RB in each grade represent-
ing the total rent . 
Seager recognizes the new fact ors which enter into the rent of 
ITater oower and of mines, but this exposition conta ins no new ideas 
on the subject . On other points as well, he adheres to orthodox 
inte r pretations, recognizing that successive applications of capital 
extend to an intens ive margin, which, he says, is always a no-rent 
margin. He considers the return for investment of non-recurring capital 
on land as governed by the laws of rent, rather than of interest , as do 
the majority of economists , drawing the line between tent and i nterest 
rather sooner than do most of them, perhaps . 
Certain factors formi ng apparent exceptions or complications of 
the law of rent are analyzed by Seager . First of these is the fact 
--
that cultivation may extend to the actual no-rent marg in in several kinds 
of production , for instance, that of wheat or corn, in the United States. 
Yet, according to Seager, their collective influence on rent is no dif-
ferent from that of a single one. Secondly, the rotation of crops intro-
duces a difficulty in determining in whic h belt the land actually be-
longs, but tl1is trouble 1s overcome Dy averag1ng, as 1s -c,ne "tn1rct a11:11 - -
culty, the fact that land yields different returns in different years, 
according to tbe weather . The fourth case is that of land fit only for 
one purpose , for instance a rocky piece of land in New York City . It 
will yield no rent till it becomes desired for ~esidenti al purposes ~ but 
when it is once so desired, its r ent will have reference to tbe marginal 
rent of land used for similar purposes , and its actual possibilities of 
product ion will not enter into the question . 
This covers the points maintained by Seager which bear on the doc-
trine of rent, in such a way as to change or amplify existing opinions 
of it . On the whole, it is the best exposition of site rent and its re-
lation to economic rent yet publish ed. 
Summarizing the work of the more modern adherents of Ricardo , we 
find the following characteristics in their work: 
1 . The reconciliation between site and agricultural rent is com-
pl ete . 
2. The statics and dynamics of rent are distinguished and dis-
cussed . 
3. A distinction is made between differential and marginal rent. 
4. Some of the adherents of the doctrine of rent hold that marginal 
rent is price dete r mining. 
5. The comparat ive i mmobility of le,bor and capital i s emphasized; 
other factors affecting the competitive margin of cultivation are dis-
cussed . 
6. The treatment of rent is no longer as of a single commodity . 
e 
• 
7. The useful ness of the landlord class i s established. 
8. Emphasis is laid upon Speculative Rent • 
9· The l aw is extended to some things besides land, such as 
franchises, inventions, and good-will of a business. 
10. A doctrine of quasi-rents is made dependent on the original 
theory . 
2. Modern Opponents of the Ricardian Theory . 
I n 1885 , S. N. Patten published a work, "The Premises i f Political 
Economy ," in which he assail ed the doct rine of rent on antiquated grounds, 
f ollowing r ather th e developm ent of thought used by Carey t han that of 
the mode rn economists; yet, as ~any consider him t he first of modern 
opponents of the t heory of rent , his work i s discussed in this place . 
He makes the f ol lowing counts , * none of th em valid , against the theory . 
1. The poorest l and in cultivat ion must pay rent, for it woul d 
yield a rent if used as grazing land,- a fact true enough , but far from 
the point . 
2. Some of the land of t he country mus t be left in f orests , else 
the fertil ity of the remai ning l and will decline. 
3. Unfavo r able situation can never make land pay no rent , because 
home industries will make it yield some amount . 
4. Fertility is not fixed, but varie s, the relative ferti lity of 
differ~nt fields changi ng considerably under different circumstances . 
5. Poor lands will become good, as po~ulation come s to them. 
6. Obstructions to cul t ivation which mus t be removed , before new 
l -and can be t aken into cultivat ion, hampe r the margi n of empl oyment . 
These f acts are al l of them true enough, but they attack the shell 
of the Ricardian theory, none of t hem getting to t he kernel. As really 
affecting Ricardo's l aw they are worthless r 
In an article on the "Interpretation of Ricardo," writ t en in April, 
1893, Patten assumes a more advanced standpoint~ this time dealing l arge-
l y with ma rginal cost. He asserts that not enough at tention i s g iven to 
the f act that the i ntelligence of entrepreneurs and farmers i s as sharpl y 
graded as are advantages of situation and fertility. He cl aims t ha t 
• subj ective di fferences in man a r e of as much importance in the theory 
of rent as are the ob jective differences in land . 
J . K. I ngram, in his "History of Poli t ical Economy," 1888 , attacks 
the law of rent on grounds which should normally have pl aced him in 
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the preceding period . On.Ly a regard tor -r.ne proper sequence or au-r,nors ._ 
war r ants an examination of his work in this place. He attacks Ricardo ' s 
theory under the following heads: 
1 . It assumes an economic man , actuated by one principle, only . 
2. It does not allow the force of custom, as against competition . 
3. It allows no such thing as combination. 
4. It assumes equality of contract in all transactions . 
5. It assumes a def inite, universal rate of profits a,nd wages in 
a community , i mplying 
a . Complete mobility of capital . 
b. Complete mobility of wages . 
c . Complete knowledge of industrial conditions by both cap-
i tal and labor . 
6. It takes no account of emigration. 
7. It takes no account of the influence of intelli gence, organiza-
tion, machinery or commu nication on the cost of production . 
E. B. Andrews , in his "Institutes of Economics ," 1889, considers 
that rent, in t he broadest sense~ is any kind of gain arising from 
monopoly, whether in land~ capital, or talent income which f alls 
to the possession of any productive agency simply because of it s 
rarity . To economic rent he appli es the restrictive term, "ground rent . n 
He is a. fore- runner of the modern followers cf Hobson, for he considers 
that neither ground nor capital rents enter price as l ong as ground or 
• J investment opportunities are free , but when they a.re monopolized , the 
produce must be sold higher to pay for the monopoly rent , and this 
price is determined in part by reht . 
J . B. Cl ark, in an article i n the " Quarterl y Jo.urnal of Economics, 11 
April , 1891, discusses the l aw of rent as appl ying nat only _to land , 
but to the ot~er f actors of distribution as well. He says , "Tbe prin-
ciple that has been made to govern the income derived from land ~ctually 
governs those derived from cap i tal and from labor. Interest as a 
whole is rent; and even wages as a whole are so . Both of these in-
comes are {{different i al gains , " and ar·e gauged in amount by the Ricardian 
Excluding " pure profit" from his discussion, by reducing society to 
a stat ic condition, he attempt s, by a use of the rent law, to account for 
all that remains • In the case of wages , he fi nds the di ffere ntial gain 
• to be that return earned by the labo rer before his increasing weariness 
·' e.J and desire for recreation make his wage just equal to the ener,gy con-
sumed and pleasure foregone in earning it . "As the last hour of labor 
in a day fi gures as the final unit in the supply of l abo r, and determines--
the rat e of wages , so the l ast dime saved in a day constitutes the final 
increment in the suppl y of capital, and figures in a corr esponding v1 ay 
in the ad justment of interest. Wages and interest depend on the loca-
tion of the two marginal lines of subjective equilibrium of gains and 
los ses entailed by product ion. They are also the lines f rom which the 
two varieties of producer ' s subjective rent are measured. These two 
rents are the differential gains accru ing from what we may term in~£§-
mar ginal labor and abstinence ,o r the working and the waiting that cost 
the rr: en J.ess than do the vlorkinf <:md the w1.:dting that insure the fina.l 
i ncrements of labor and capital." 
In support of this theory of rent in wages and profits , he defines 
tbe term to fit his conception. "Wages in the ag_grege.te constitute the 
i ncome derived by society from its entire fund of pure labor energy ; 
and in t erest is in like manner , the product of a fund of pure capital . 
Both are differential gains , and comp l etely amenable to the Ricard i an 
l aw .= Further t han this , he claims that the "rent which is wages and 
interes t i s a truer rent than t hat of land i tself , for they are self-
determining, whereas the r-ent of land is dependent upon th em . The 
product of labor at the margin will always conform to general wages , 
simply because the margin itself will advanc e or recede till this 
conformity r esult s. Philosophically, therefore , the ren t of a piece of 
· ·~ 
• 
land, if , for simplicity,auxiliary capital be disregarded, is its product 
less the wages of the labor that tills it . The pay of the farmer 's men 
conforms directl y to the rate that prevails in the gener al l abor ma r·ket , 
and the data for cal cul at i ng the landlord's cl a i m are~ therefore, the 
orodnct of the farm and the r ate of general wages . 11 
The substance of the foregoing is embodied in Cla,r k' s book on t he 
"Di stri bution of Weal th , 11 wh ich contains a much fuller discussion of 
rent and price than does the article in t he " Quarterl y Jou r nal . 11 Here 
he states: "The fact is, t hat rent is universally an element in the 
determining of values and prices. " He outlines his position in the 
following sentences . • "Rent is pri marily to be regarded as a 
product traceable to a concrete agent , or as a distinguishable part of 
supply . The rent of l and , t hen , as the concrete product i mputable to 
land , is emphat~cally an el ement in determining value. The r ent of 
all the agent s of product i on consti t ute , when society is in a natural 
static condition , the entire supply of goods; and the supply t hat is 
furnished by any one of them - or~ in other words~ t he concrete rent of 
it - is; of course , one of the value- determining elements ••• Rent , 
th en, is an element in determining, not only r elat ive val ues , but t he 
sum of values creat ed. It is all this, because it is itself i dentical 
wi th supply. The rent of the l and in a particular industry is the part 
of the supply of the product of that industry which is traceable to the 
l and . The rent of all land used in production is that part of the supply 
of commodi t i es in general that is trac eable to land. Rent and imputed 
suppl y, or partial supply traced to one agent~ are synonymous terms; 
and comparative supply fixes relative val ues while total supply ~ ixes 
total values . '1 
Clark, in exam inin~ trad itional proofs that rent does not enter 
into cost of production , as serts that the cl ass ical econom ists have 
proved that i t makes no difference which factor of .production secures 
rent finally, but t hat t hey have not at all proved that rerit i t s elf has 
no effect - He himself, unlike l ater economi sts who follo w hi m, considers 
that al l rent~ differential as w~ll as marginal , enters into priee; 
for while he makes no statement on this head, it is evident from the 
paragraphs just quoted, that there is in his mind no clear, or any , 
for that matter , distinction between them. 
John A. Hobson , in the April «Qua,rterly Journal of Economics" 
for 1891, has the .same idea as Clark, except i n the matter of rent 
and price., and follsws it out even more systemat ically. He considers 
c:e that a . .cy extra payment for capital or labor, over a certain minimum, 
out at 3% for capital , and 15 s . for wages ~ is to be regarded as a 
true rent, since •the margin of employment" can be raised or lowered 
in the case of capital and labor as wel l as in that of rent , inasmuch 
as there is always a new supply of capital or labor to be bad as soon 
as the return makes its use profitable. Not only is this true, but 
the l aw of di minish ing returns is equally operative in the case of 
land , capital, and l abor , for investment of labor on giv en cap ital, 
as on a factory , or of capital on given l abor , an on maBy tools for 
one man , reaches a point of diminishing returns . "An intense use of 
any given piece of land, capital or labor~ beyond a certain point , 
causes a diminishing return. The margin of employment is thus lowered 
i n each case. And an inferior (or more costly) quality of l and ; capital 
or l abor is called i nto us e; the r ent of each rent-paying portion rising 
with each fall in the marg in 6f employment. " 
His study examines attent ively (1) the constituents of price~ and 
(II) the appo rtionment of the product bet. ween the owners of the requi -
s ites of production . 
1. While admi tting that the di fferebtial rent of land does not 
enter i nto price , he is Hot sati sfied with t he traditional arguments 
which support this vi ew . These he considers to be two . The first ,-
that the pr ice would not fall , were a landlord to forego hi s rent ,-he 
makes negligibl e by the statement that ne i ther would rent fall were a 
manufacturer t o forego his profits ; nor a l aborer his wages,. The 
second , that the price 0f any product is the same regardless of whether 
it was r a i sed on the best l and, or on ma rginal, he answers somewhat 
less convi ncingly. He states that this argument mi ght appl y equally 
to profi ts or wages , that the pri c e of the product is th e same whether 
produced i n a way to return max i mum or mi nimum profits or wages , minimum 
profit s or wages forming a mar gin of employment no less definite than 
t hat of cultivation, except that the minimum pro f i ts are st ill a certain 
... 
.j_ Q • 30! ra~;e , ~ay .te , and minimum wages a certain sum, say 15 s . He cons i ders 
that the fact that these mi nima are not zero is of no account ; for that 
return is required to call capital and labor into use , whereas ~~mything 
about zero will result in cultivat ion of the l and . It seems that this 
argument is not sound , and that it may be answered in this way: Given 
t hat 3% return on capital and 15 s . per week to the l aborer must be 
gained from the product, how can it be paid them unle ss the pr ice is such 
as cover this sum? i. e., unl ess profits and wages enter into ~Tice 
sufficient l y to return to thems el ves a mini mum? But t he rent of land 
does not need tG enter into pr i ce a t al l as i t requires no minimum above 
zero . 
Hobson does not deny the fact that d ifferent i al rent can not enter 
into the pric e of products , but he wishes to include the minimum rent 
of capital and wages in the statement. 
So far i n our const i t uents of pr ice we have the statement that 
rent , a 3% retu rn on capital , and 15 s. a week for wages~ do not enter 
into pr ice. What does enter into it? According to Hobson, "Wherever 
the peculia r properties or requirements of land as a requisite of pro-
duction ass i gn an absolute limit t o the suppl y , so that a fall in the 
--
margin of cultivat ion cannot adequately operate , this absoluteness of ,.. 
monopoly gives a rent to t he worst land in us e for a part icul ar object, 
and enables that rent t o fi gure i n prices . So in other matters , 
lcmd at the marg i n of cultivat i on for c ertain specific objects yields 
a positive rent which f i gures in price . The s ame is true of business 
• 
profits, and wages ." It must be concluded then~ that ain all trades 
or forms of investm.ent nhere restricted compet ition enables the margin 
of steady employment to be represented by a return of more than 3%~ 
this special return is a special element in the pr·ice of the commodi-
ti es which such capital helps to produce." The same is true of l abor, 
requiring special skill, strength , or disagreeability . 
Ou~ net result is this: The only traceable constituent in pric e 
i s the degree in which, for some ce.use, the margin of empl oyment cannot 
operate. Rather a meager total, to account for the price of goods • 
II . The apportionment of the product he summarizes as follows : 
1 . If there exists an indefinite quantity of each of the requi-
sites of production just below the marg in of employment, of almost equal 
quality t o that UJ;:lon the marg in, an increase in production will neither 
al t.er the proportion of distribution among the mmers of the three requi-
sites no r appreciably raise the rent of any unit of a requisite above 
the margin . 
2. If there is not a sufficient quantity of any of the requisites 
of production easily avail able for the new sepply, and the difficulty 
of procuring each piece of additional supply is equal in the case of 
each requisite, the rent paying unit of land, capital and l abor, will 
rise, but the proportion of distribution of the aggregate product will 
remain unchanged. 
3. If there is a difference in the amount of difficulty of pro-
curing the increased suppl y of the t hree requisites, that difference 
will be accurately measured by the relative rise in rent of the rent-
paying portion of each requisite, and by a corresponding. al tera.tion in 
the proportion of the aggregate product which falls to each , i. e., if 
it is des irable to increase · by 20% the quantity of each requisite of 
production in order to increase the product , and it is twice as diffi cult 
to procure the increased quant ity of land as of capital and labor, one-
half of the increased product will go as rent, to land , one-quarter as 
rent to capital , one-quarter as rent to labor. The change as regards 
the total product (old and nev;) may of course be reckoned by determining 
the proportion which the new product bears to the total product. 
In the "Economics of Distribution," 1900, Hob~on, besides consider-
ing that rent of land , wages and interest , is analogo us , holds to the 
theory t hat mar·g inal rents ent,er into price. In the case of extensive 
ma rgins , to which other writers along these l ines have confined their 
arguments , he agrees with them, and uses the same arguments they employ. 
Unlike them, however , he does not dodge the issue where intensive mar-
gi ns are concerned, but examines the no- rent application of eapital at 
length . He comes to the following conclusion: * "The root-fallacy 
of the ~ dose ' illustration consists, then , in a false separation which 
i gnores the organic nature of production and the Law of Substitution. 
The real determinant of price of a suppl y from the ~ cost' side will · e 
found to reside in the comparative advantage of emp loyin,g various 
combinations of the f actors of production . In considering how a new 
increment of wheat supply, evoked by rising pr ices , will be produced , 
nothing is learned by suppos ing it to be raised by applying a new unit 
of capital and l abour to wheat land already in us e. The real problem for 
considerat ion will be, ' What changed proportion of the several factors 
will most ea~ily turn out the increased supply? ' Should more l abour be 
applied to the same l and ~ or should more land be worked by the same 
l abour , or should more capital be . added , or what should be t he conjunc-
t i on of additional factors ? 
"The net result of this argument is that t he application of the 
Law of Rent to the intensive cultivation of a single factor must be 
rejected as fallacious ." 
0. W. MacFarl ane published in 1899 a book, "Value and Distribu-
tion, " i n which he sets forth the tenet s to the followers of Clark and 
Hobson , i n regard to r ent and price . He considers rent t6 be a d i ffer-
ential surplus , profits a marginal surplus, and interest and wages to 
be normal surpluses . He deems it wise to " say that every price-
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determined surplus is the rent of the corresponding factor of production." 
In t he development of · his argument# he refers to the statement of 
Mill that "when land capable of yielding rent in agriculture is applied 
to some other purpose, the rent which it would have yielded is an element 
in the cost of production of the commodity which it is employed to pro-
duce . " This he conside rs to be a practical admission of the fact that 
there is no no-rent land# and st~tes that if this is so, rent does enter 
into the determination of price. Of course this is not to the point, 
for as long as there is a no- rent appl ication of capital, the theory 
holds. MacFarlane overlooks this point , however, and considers that 
he has demolished the theory . 
After quoting Clark and Hobson, and drawing inferences from Mill 
and Marshall, he states, without proof of his own , that "it may be 
maintained that emonomists are today well agreed that rent is a general 
function, common to all factors of production. In other words, that 
every surplus wh ich does not enter into the determination of price i s 
a rent , whether it is secured by landlord,capitalist , or entrepreneur. 11 
A. S. Johnson is another economist who holds with Hobson and others 
that rent is governed by laws governtng interest and wages as well , and 
the,t o:r;ice is determined by residual rent.* He defines his position 
in the follGving paragraph : t ( 1902) 
"It (rent) is a differential income, but in the same sense wages 
and interest are differentials. It may be computed residual ly; but 
this is merely a matter of convenience in theory , except in the case 
of l and which is not capable of alternative uses , and which is not 
related through margins t o other land capable of such uses . There is, 
however , labor and capital in like position . Residual wages and 
interest are no more analomous than residual rent . There may be good 
reason for making a distinction between the productive incomes of mo-
bile and i mmob ile ~gents, but that distinction would not mark off wages 
a nd interest from rent . » 
In regard to rent and price, Johnson considers that the mobility 
or i mmob ility of l and i s the determining factor. Where land can be put 
to but one use, he admits that the Ricardian law is valid . But where 
land can be put to several, it must appear in the price of the commodity 
produced on it, in order to secure the supply of that commodity ; and 
as supply is one end of the balance of value, rent most accordingly figure 
in price. 
Henry C. Taylor , in an articl e on "The Differenti al Rent of Farm 
Land" in the (!Quarterly Journal of Economics" for Au.gust , 1903, has 
for his purpose: "To consider the influence of variations in the effi-
ciency of farmers and in the intensity of culture upon the amount of 
rent which will be paid for the use of land and to point out that be-
cause of these variations differential rent cannot be measured in terms 
of di fferences in productivity." 
Taylor proceeds to show that the most efficient farmer will gravi~ 
tate towards the most product ive land, and the marginal farmer towa rd 
marginal land, a fact probably true. Accordingly the output from the 
bes t farm will be greater in proportion to the output of the marginal 
farm, than i s the fertility of the best farm in proportion to that of 
the marginal farm . "Hence the differential rent of land cannot be 
measured ·in terms of productivity . '' Taylor ' s premises seem reasonable , 
but his conclusion is wrong. His is a mistaken definition of produc-
tivity, wh i ch should be confined to fertility~ including situation. 
That excess in the surplus over the difference in fertility is "wages 
of management" and does not enter into rent. Taylor ' s i dea is correct . 
"Rent cannot be measured in terms of differences in productivity," as 
he understands the word . But when any economist says that rent is 
measured in terms of productivity, he means by the nord something entire- . 
ly different from Taylor, and accordingly the latter's essay is not to 
the point. 
Frank A. Fetter , in his " Prin~ciples of Economi cs , '' 1904 , has 
attempted to get away from Ricardo's exposition of the law of rent, 
while holding to its principles , and has formulated an idea of rent 
absolutely dependent on the Ricard i an theory, yet so changed in 
treatment as to be at first unrecognizable. The valuable oart of 
his work consists solely in those principles, such as the law of di -
minishing returns, and effect of i mprovements on rent, with which 
Ricardo deals , possibly excepting a discussion of the effects, very nat~ 
ural, to be sure, of deprebiation on rent . His plan of treatment by 
... topic sentences, and nnfamil iar illustrations, is 1 i ttle fitted to an 
exposition of the lav; of rent , a proposition as 1 i ttl e adapted to such 
treatment as any that could well be i magined , and hi s point of view, 
that of human desires , involves him in further difficulties. He offers 
no mod ification or criticism of the Ricard i an theory , for where he does 
not adopt it implicitly, he seems to ignore it. His work is that of a 
man des irous of establishing a new treatment of rent; and as that new 
treatment has nothing in common wi th that with whose modification we 
are concerned , a short analysis of his fundamen tal principles is suff i -
cient. 
In the first place , then, what is his definition of rent? He con-
siders that "The essential thought in rent,» as he intends to use i t , 
«is that it is the value of the usufruct as distinguished from the value 
of the use-bearer or thing itself.» The essent i al thing in this defin i-
tion is that it means nothing more than the common , unscientific return 
to capital as wel l as land, which i s commonl y t ermed rent. The def i-
nition is ent i rely at variance with every idea of economic rent whatever, 
no matter how crudely stated. But perhaps it is better not to criticise 
too harshly till we have found out what he does consider to be economic 
rent; th i s we find to be the new rent left after allowance is made for 
repairs, depreciation , and various expenses, "the market value of the 
usufruct ,'' but it is still the uva:_ue of the usufruct ." This notion 
is absolutely untenable. Rent nffirer was and never can be the value of 
the usufruct or anything else. Rent is a surplus of one value over 
.. 
another , but it can never be value itself . Let us f i nd an exampl e 
of Fetter ' s definition: Suppose a nan hires a farm, and the usufruct, 
"the essential thought in rent," is worth $1000 per annum. To find 
the true economi c rent , according to Fette r , we must ded uc t an al.J.ovT-
a nce made for "repa irs, depreciat ion , and for var ious expenses"amounting 
perhaps to $200. Then the remainin~ $800 is economic rent . This is 
mani f estly absurd , yet it is manifestly the "value of the usufruct" 
after certa in above mentioned deductions . What does the t enant live off 
of? Is t here to be no allowance f or profits , interest and wages , in the 
deduction? Apparently not; and if' not, Fetter does not t ouch upon the 
lavT of rent. It vlill probably be :::aid in reply to this criticism of 
Fetter that he has stat ed his case badly, even as Ricardo himself did ; 
but at a ny rate , the Ri card i an theory of rent was int elligible, which 
this is not . Fetter himself sees tha t his definition is a little weak, 
for he "redef ines r ent ," later on, "as the value of the scarce uses of 
wealth within a given period . " "V!~ue of scarce uses" hardl y seems to 
be r ent . 
Apart from his def initions , Fc~tter emphasizes points i nherent in 
t he Ricardian theory . He distingui shes well between economic and con-
tract rent : his exposition of the law of diminishi ng retur ns wi th 
ext ensive and int ens ive mar gins of utilizations , is able; he explains 
the differential advantages of l ands and thei r products in terms of 
quantety and quality , off erin,B in t.h i s way , an advance on the oldeL~ 
economi s ts ; be di s cusses the eff ec;ts of dep r eciation and improvements 
in a. manner novel and true. But t :J.ese points have all been treated by 
other eco nom ists , and need not be brought up again at thi s time . In 
these respects, Fetter real ly sheds light upon the theory of rent , but 
hardl y enough to offs et the darkness of hi s definitions . 
I n an article entitled "The P~s s ing of the Old Rent Concept , " i n 
th e "Quarterl y Journal of Economics " for May, 1901 , Fetter devel ops his 
own theory mo~e at length. The essay is chief ly an at tack on Marshall 
who , to his mi nd , embodies the old r ent concept , but there are some 
• + ' L • • ' p ositl VB S uc:~emeil"t-'S lD l "t. His Review and Conclusion contains all his 
points , which are somewhat unclear in their present ation in the body of 
the paper. His proposition is this: 
There are several concepts upon which any mod i f ied acceptance of 
the Rj_cardian theory must rest, namely: 
1. The land concepts, an idea that the return from all l and i s r ent. 
2. The extension, or space concept, a narrowing of the first con-
cept to stable and indestructible properties of land. 
• 3. The no-cost concept, an idea that materi al services l..,endered by 
the free gifts of lands do not involve a cost. 
4. The time concept, a quasi-rent theoPy. 
5. The exchanger's surplus cor.cept, a loose extension of the thought 
that any surplns may be looked upon as rent . 
Fette r believes that: "The old concept of rent is passing; it is 
not being undermined by attacks of the old sort , by those who do not seek 
to understand it; but it is now abandoned in all but form by those who 
represent the mos t conservative wing of economic thought. 
aThe vaPious new concepts con::;idered are imperfec t and unsuccess'ful 
efforts to escape the difficulties of the older view. 
c'The use of the term '(rent" for any surplus above 'real' cost i s 
out of harmony ~ith the conception of rent as a regularly accrui ng in-
come , and with the practical needs of a money economy in which ·the 
concept must be emplcryed. 
"The doctrine of quasi - rents , involving the idea that no income or 
share enters into market prices in short periods , cannot stand. On ~he 
other hand , the recognition that thel"'e is no difference in short pe-
riods between l and and other wealth in relation to market values is a 
great advance . 
"The relation which rare and 11ot e~sily producible appl iances have 
to market price over long per iods of time is of just the opposite char-
acter from t hat asserted. The less capable of increase particular 
appliances are, the greater income they yield, the more, therefore , 
e 
• 
ituenters i nto price" as the demand 1 for their products increases . 
({The need for a new concept of rent which will evade the diffi-
c ulties of t he old is evident. The way is prepared for it by the old 
and the patent difficulties of the ;substitutes that have pr-esented." 
~ etter says, in the Annals of the American Economic Association for 
1904 , that : "The characterization Jf rent as that income from material 
agents which does not enter i nto cost of production and of interest as 
the income which does enter was a shifting of the central thought of 
the concept; what was at first thought to be a merely incidental pe-
culiarity of l and rent, 8ecarn e its essential feature, and then the 
c enter of a more general concept of rent." 
It would be difficult to put the net results of Fetter's work in 
any concise form ; many of his i deas are excellent, his comp rehension 
of the various concepts of rent is wide, yet it is not evident where he 
himself stands . He rejects both the classical and the most modern 
' ( th f t' .p 1 1 "' ""} . ) t' ,, n t} l t' 1 v1ews , -- ose o- ne J.OJ. •• owers 0 1. u .ark , ·.nougn or 1e a ·-Ger ne accepts 
the price-determining power of mar~~ inal rent, and of the former most 
of the fundamental principles . He must be regarded, then, a s a des-
tructi ve critic, unsatisfied with bo-th definitions of rent, but unable 
to suggest a better. 
F. T. Carleton, in the "Quart erly Journal of Eco nomics" for November . 
1907. writes on "The Rent Concept, Narrowed and Broadened." Hi s theme 
is the reconciliation of rent received from land us ed for man ufactures, 
and from that used for agriculture~ He seems , however, both to nar row 
a nd broaden the concept too f ar. He s t a tes his position in the follow-
ing paragraphs: 
"The true function of all lawi is, in f act, reduced to t hat of l and 
in a cd ty; namely, to that of fornulating a site upon which to do 
business . The value of the site depends upon the 'market opportunity' 
which i t offers ." 
"A sharp line of demarkation may be drawn between interest and 
•market opportunity rent , ' or rent. The concept of rent as applied 
to a return received from land is n11rrowed to include only that por-
tion of the total return which is d11e to situation i n respect to a 
market , or in other words , to that ~hich is due to land cons idered 
as an a r ea up on whic h to carry on industrial operat ions or to perform 
services which are demanded by soci ety. On the other hand , the concept 
is broadened so as to include all returns which are due to special 
privileges , - to market opportunities of all kinds . Land r ent i n its 
re stricted sense is only one f orm of rent . v "Rent is an i ncome r e-
ceived because of the existence of some economic privilege or desirable 
market opportunity which is not suscepti ble of dep r eciat ion i n the sense 
of physical wear and tear . n 
He i ncl udes the return from mcnopolies secured by franc hises . from 
special abilities, from patents , et.c . , i n his definition of rent, and , 
in short, makes any differential re!turn come und er t hat head . The 
narrowing of the concept is much metre valuable, and would be pe r f ectl y 
acceptable , were some allowance ma~l e for the inclusion of fertility in 
the factors whic h determine the r ent of ag ricultural land. 
Carlton had previously discusE;ed rent in an article in the " Quar-
terly Journal of Economiosn for Au~~ust , 1906 , on the "Relation of Mar-
ginal Rent s to Price. v 
In that article, he came to t l1e conclusion t hat r ent as a r ule 
cannot enter price, but that there i s one case in which i t must do so , 
namely , when what he cal ls "absolu·~e inte nsive marginal rentv appears . 
He uses the term "marginal rent» i 1  its usual sign i f icance ; and by 
intens ive rent, he means rent from successive appl icat ions of capi tal . 
By use of the word "absolute ,v he ind i cates a mi ni mum marginal return 
below which the necessary capital 1'ill not be invested . Such a rent , 
he cons iders, will appear whenever monopoly power of any kind exists , 
and that rent will enter price as 1io wages and interest, and " will accrue 
to the factor possessing t he monopJly power, whether land , labor or cap-
ital." All other rent , boweve r , can never form an element in price . 
*Cf . P • ? 2 
Ce.rl ton also attempts a classification of economists according to 
t , e1' r s ·'-P.ndl. nP· on +u~nP. o··1est1· on of r nnt and price. ,n L~. ~ _ o _ .. _ ~ _ Be recognizes t wo 
cl a.sses ;'J i th two sub-classes , as fo:.lovrs : 
1. Yi ri ters distinguishing mar:~inal from different i al rent , as to 
effect on price: 
a Those who retain the tsrm rent . 
e. ~ · Mi ll , Robson , Patten . 
b. Those considering rent as surplus. 
e. g. MacFarlane. 
2. Writers recognizing no di stinction between ma r ginal and d i f -
ferential rents , as to effect on prices . 
a . Those holding that no rent enters price. 
e . g. Marshal l , Bullock, Holl ander . 
b. Those holding that all rent enters price. 
e . g. Clark, Fetter . 
App ropos to these departures from the original law of ren t, Hyde 
s eems ri g_ht ·ahen he s ays :• "I am pei'suaded that the general acceptc:,nce 
of t he concept of price- determi nin§: ren t has been due not only t o a 
failure to reco,gnize that a no-rent margin of cultivation ah 1ays exists 
i n intensive, i f not extensive, cultivation, but also to a failure to 
e,Dp l y the sa.m e fundamente.l pr inciples of rent to l and devoted to several 
productive uses that we do to land devoted to single use. • • The Cl ass i-
f ication of rents as "differential =' and "margi nal" or "price-determined" 
and uprice...:o:ete :em ining, '' seems a snperficial one. It is a cl a ssifica-
tion which has long pervaded econo~ ic thought, but I do not believe 
that the inconsistencies of the di stinction have be en squarely faced . 
If the analy sis of the problem wh i ch I have ventured is a correct one, 
we have in thi s differentiat ion of rents departed from the broad highway 
of the Ri cardian economics only to find our selves entangled in a maze 
of i ntricac ies and obscurities from which we must sooner or later re-
trace our steps . " 
• rn an article on " The Concept of Pri ce Determining Rent ," 
Journ &l . Political mcnn . R~8RR 
The criticism of thE ~odern opponents of Rica rdo takes enti rel y 
different lines from those fo llowed by his earlier antagonists . The 
newer criticism may be gat hered under three heads . 
1. An extensi0n of the term rent to include any differential 
retur n, whether of l and , labor or capital . 
2. The concept of a price-determining rent . Either marginal 
rent , or both marginal and differential rent are cons idered as ele-
ments of pr ice , the former by the followers of Hobson, and the latter 
_..- by those of Clar k. 
~ 
3. Minor points. 
a. I mpossibil ity of competitive rents . 
b. Emphas is on the personal equation. 
c . Increase of rent cons ide r ed due to the arrangement of t he 
factors of product i on. 
- - - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Hav i ng now come to an end of t he di scussion, a word as to the 
general lines of development f ollowed by critic ism of t he l aw of rent 
is fitting. I mmediately after Ricardo ~ave his theory to the world, in 
1817, it gained almost universal acceptance . Followe r s of Ricar do , such 
as ~!ames Mill and MacCulloch, relieved the t heory of many of the f ault s 
of statement or det ail made by t he au,thor ; and after t hem, t heir 
succes sors wer e ent i rely engaged i n ampl i f i cation and explanat ion of t he 
doctrine al mos t to t he l as t decade of the century . Opponent s of the 
t heory built th~ir objections on an idea of a power of pos i tive fe rtility 
in l and , capable of giving rise to rent , on t he abse nce of no-rent l and , 
and on t he defects of the statement of the Ricardian l aw from a histo r i-
cal s t and- point . Of these opponents , the greatest and most bi tter was 
Henry Carey. 
With wr i te rs as early as J . 8. Mill and Jevons , however, c ame in 
the idea that marginal rents were at least i nherent i n pr ice, t hough 
po ssibly not price- dete rm in ing. The seeds of t his i dea thus sown , 
blossomed i n two simultaneous articles by Clark and Hobson, in 1891 , 
• 
the f ormer of these contending that all rents affect price~ and the 
latter, that marginal rents have their result . Since then, dis-
cussion has been rife on the point raised by Hobson , and economists 
are at present near ly equally divided , a slight majority, perhaps , 
favoring his view. 
Walker saw analogies in surplus profit to rent, and writers 
since his time have seen analogy after analogy in the factors of 
distribution, till with Cl ark and Hobson , the idea took form that 
&ny differential surplus in distribut~on was rent . On this head, 
again, present opinion is undecided, most economists preferring, ho t-l-
ever, to restrict the term rent to lamd and a few analogous social 
products . 
Those who have followed Ricardo more cl osely in his theory have 
been employed with the statics and dynamics of the question , with 
«mi tigat ing circumstances" entering into the operat ion of the law, 
and with the doctrine of quasi-rents evolved by Marshall . Some of 
the adherents of the law of rent i n other respects , hold with Hobson 
that marginal rent enters price. 
Such is the situation at present . It is difficult to forecast 
the turn of discussion in the future , especially as littl e is being 
said on the subject of rent just now, but it seems probable that 
befors long this quest i on of marginal rent and price will be more 
thoroughly threshed out; that the term rent will be restricted to 
land and certain "opportunities; " and that the doctrine of quasi -
rent will be more vigorously attacked~ 
II. 
The Theory of Rent in Relation to the Single Tax Proposals . 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to i nquire into the vir-
. 
tues and feasibilities of any Single Tax proposal ~ but merely to 
show that they one and all depend on the theory of rent as formulated 
--
by Ricardo and his followers. This dependence is so absolute that 
any too great modification of the law~ destructive or constructive, 
' 
• 
such as that proposed by Clark or Fetter, will directly attack the 
Single Tax as well as the theory of rent . It is convenient to state 
• 
here at the beginning of this portion of the discussion exactly what 
is this relation of rent to the single tax before examining in detail 
the opinions of George and others upon it: 
Rent , according to every exponent of the Single Tax, is a social 
product, and society should reap the benef it of its own work and in-
fluenc.e. This is the argument in a nut shell . That money or produce 
paid by the tenant to the landlord for permission to use his land has 
its origin, not in any useful work performed by the beneficiary~ but 
in the soil itself~ which allows an excess of produce on some lots 
over that obtained by equal investment in others . This i ncome in 
reality has its rise i n the constitution of society at large: where 
there ~re few settlers ~ there is no rent; but when population increases , 
and cultivation and production are forced on to less advantageous land~ 
rent arises . Th i s rent is due to the progress of society and repre-
sents exactly the hardship undergone by those who are forced to take up 
inferior l and . The owner has nothing to do with it, for society creates 
it ~ increases it, and suffers on account of its private appropriation. 
I ~ The logical thing to do, then, according to the Single Taxer , i s to give 
it back to society . 
On examining the var ious arguments for the taxation of ground rent 
alone , it is apparent that an idea of injustice, economic , fi .nancial 
l. 
and ethical~ in the appropriation by an individual of the social product , 
is underlying. These arguments may be classified as follows: 
1. Financial and Economic Arguments. 
a . Rent is a social fund which exactly corresponds to the 
needs of society. "All the public and private i mpr ove-
ments of a community today are reflected in the land 
values of that community . " "Not more perfectl y, nor more 
literally~ is your image reflected in the -mirror, than are 
public improvements reflected in the ve,l ue of l and .1'':' 
b. A Tax on land cannot be shifted . Increasing the rent 
will not shift it upon the tenant,-else the selling value 
of land would not be reduced , as at present , by the capi-
t ali zed tax imposed upon it. :1' 
c. The selling value of l and i s an untaxed value. Every pur-
chase r of 1 and makes allowance for the capitalized tax upon 
it, and pays for it a proportionately smaller sum, thus mak-
ing land recently purchased free from any tax burden.*t 
d. The single tax is a nonrepressive tax. "Wholly a tax upon 
special privilege, it can never be a burden upon industry 
or commerce, tior can it ever operate to reduce the wages of 
l abor, or increase prices to the consumer."~* 
e. The single tax is the simplest tax. "It would dispense 
with a hoi:de of tax gatherers, simplify government and 
greatly reduce its cost. It would do away with the corrup-
tion and gross inequality inseparable from our present 
methods . It would rel ieve all worl{ei.~s and capitalists 
of those taxes by which they now are unjustly burdened , 
and would take for public uses that value which justly 
belongs to the public . " tt 
II . Ethical Argument. 
a. Rent is a social product. . "The value of land is the 
product of the labor (outlay) of society, which is thus 
as much entitled to the income as is the individual en-
~~. },J? . -P ~llet-j?rovln~A · ~ · )i,,~f !faxat~on , u . 5 . Cf . also ouotation -r,.. 0 m 
.I.L-:LS J.S "e ~nu o ___ l_leoro~7n s e'~->onTients. ~ - -- --
*~T~e third of Fillebrown's Argumeni~ . - Shearman 
titled to the ~reduct of his i ndividual labor. * 
b. Class oppr ess i on i s the result of the private appro-
priation of r ent . Let society t ake back its own, and 
labor and cc:.pi tal wi ll cE vi de between them their _join-'-
products in equitable proportion. This i s George ' s 
favor i te argument . 
c. Land and rent are free gi fts of God , and s hould not be 
app ro pr i ated by i ndiv iduals . 
to the use of the earth . 
All men have a common right 
~ach of these a rguments depends absolutel y upon the Ricard i an 
Theory of r ent . The financ ial and economic argument as a whole depends 
upon t he fac t that the surplus r eturn f rom l and i s entirel y different 
frq m the surplus from any othe r factor of production whatsoever , recog-
nizing that the rent of l a nd can be wrung from the tenant, on account of 
mere diff erence in l and value , and must exist regardless of any modify i ng 
circumstances wh erever the law of comp et it i on operates . The econ6mi st 
says t hat r ent is a result of t he progr es s of populati on ; t he s i ngle 
t axer , ,,.iOrking from t hat f act , asserts that i t should belong to society . 
The economis t says that the l andlo rd rece ives the surplus product , tak in~ 
al l that t he tenant can pay unde r any c ircumstances ; reasoning from this , 
t he single t axer finds t hat as he cannot get more from the tenant , he 
must pay a tax on it himsel f , and cannot shif t it on to any ultimate 
consumer . This same a r gument is also inherent i n the s t atement t hat 
t he single t ax i s a non- repress ive tax. If such a tax cannot be shifted , 
i t cannot hurt any cl as s other than that at wh i ch i t i s a imed . 
Wi th these economic outgrowths from rent as pr em ises , common sense 
su.g,_gests the other t wo financial and economj_c arg,uments ment ioned ; The 
sell i ng val ue i s untaxed , because man ' s self-interes t shows hi m that a 
purchase is only worth it s net value to hi m af ter all charges aga inst 
i t , such as taxes , are deducted; and the single t ax i s the s i mpl est 
tax for it deals wi th only one f actor of produption whil e our present 
*"Bingle Tax Catech ism," p r epsred by C. B ~ F ille br own , p . 6 
system deal s with all . 
The ethical arguments depend on the nature of rent no less than 
do the f inancial: The economist declares rent to be the difference 
~~ · on +~,e· ,~and c·J.~ ·the .tRort.un~te , ana' t-l~ . ~~ o·_P +n' e between uue re~urn ull w -- ~!J w 
less fortunate. Justice demands that any such inequality- --a result 
of pure chanqe, and dependent on no skill of the individual--~shall be 
rectified by giv irrg to society at large this unearned and undeserved 
surplu~, making the wealth of each depend on his own efforts, in the 
e.. form of labor or of earned capital. When this is done, and the undue 
advantage of land removed, labor and capital will settle their dif-
ferences amicably, since both will then be on: the same level, and differ 
only in this : that labor is present l abor, while capital is stored-up 
labor. 
With this in view, we examine what Henry George has to say on the 
s ubject of rent. 
George has a good g~~ep of the fundamental meaning of the law, 
though, as i s natural in one who is about to formulate a theory upon 
it, he emphasiz~s some points in it more than others. He dwells on 
the fact that the selling price is capitalized rent, a point most im-
portant for his proposal~ and also on the fact that rent is the price 
of monopoly . Many woul d take exception to this second statement , for 
rent is sur ely not the eeturn for a monopoly as commonly understood; 
yet in the sense in which George uses it, the statement is justifiable: 
for he means little more than that it is a price paid by one person to 
another, not on account of any service rendered , but because of the 
possession of some material thing. It might be said that land of certain 
kinds , such as city l and, is a monopoly in the strict sense of the wo~d , 
as the supply is decidedly limited, though supply even here depends on 
demand to such an extent as to make the def inition practically meaningless. 
George makes extensive use of the law of rent in his theory of di s-
tribution. He considers that all produce goes to rent, wages~ and 
*"Progress and Poverty," Bk.III (1880). 
interest. And , as the law of rent shows what return will fall to rent, 
he considers that the laws of wages and int erest may be easily determined 
by subtraction. These two laws (of wages and interest) he considers 
practically as corollaries to Ricardo ' s theory of rent , which he accepts 
as formulated by that writer, taking except i on only to his emphasis on 
agricultural land to the neglect of urban. The result of his theorizing 
to this point i s to identify r ent "as the receiver of the increased pro-
duction which material progress gives, but which labor fails to obtain;" 
and to see "that the antagonism of interests is not between labor and 
capital as is populacly believed, but is in reality between labor and 
capital on the one side and land ownership on the other. " He has 
asserted that rent increases as time goes on ; and he now proceeds to 
·examine the causes which produce that rise . Blirst of these i s popula-
tion, which , though he regards it in an entirely different light from 
Malthus, yet must tend ."to increase rent (and cons equently to diminish 
the portion of the produce which goes to capital and labor) 3 in two 
ways: First, by lowering the margin of cultivation: second, by bringing 
out in land special capabilities otherwise latent , and by att·aching 
special capabil i ties in particular landso" Improvements , including 
those i n ,government , manners and morals , he also consider.s· will raise 
rent , f or they form an increase in the power of l abor , and w'i'/eal th in 
all its forms being the product of labor applied to land or the products 
of land , any increase in the power of labor, the demand for wealth being 
unsatisfied , will be utilized in procuring more wealth, and thus increase 
the demand for land. '1 La,-t , but most harmful , he considers the soecula-
tive holding of land which i ncreases r ent in a way more unjust than the 
others, as even the surplus is here disregarded. 
This is his t heory of r ent, #a theory like that of the cl assical 
economists , yet one which looks farther ahead, • and considers that the 
excess , rent, a social product , is wrongly withheld from soc iety, and 
that to it most industrial evils may be traced . "There is .but one 
• 
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way to remove an evil - and that is to remove its cause. Poverty deepens 
as wealth increases, and wages are forced down while productive power 
grows , because land, which is the source of all wealth, and the field of 
all labor, is monopolized. To extirpate poverty, to make wages what 
justice commands they should be, the full earnings of the laborer , we 
must therefore subs ·b i tute for the individual ownership to land a common . 
ownership. Nothing alse will go to the cause of the evil - in nothing 
else is there the slightest hope."* 
He does not, however, propose to nationalize tbe property, but 
rather to leave land in pr ivate hands, insuring improvements, etc., 
while appropriating rent in the form of a tax, thus securing both the 
benef its of public and of private ownersh i p, and assuring to society 
the value of its social product. "In fact, that rent should, both on 
grounds of expedience and justice, be the peculiar subject of taxation, 
is involved in the ac·cepted doctrine of rent, and may be found iH embryo 
in -!;.he works of all economists who have accepted the law of Ricardo. 
The,t these pr inciples have not been pushed to their necessary concl u: 
sions, · as I have pushed them, evidently arises from the indisposition 
to endanger or offend the enormous interests involved in a private 
ownership in land, and from the false theories in regard to wages and 
the cause of poverty which have dominated economic thought.» 
Geor5?e further praises the attitude of the French Economist;s , led 
·· by Ques nay and Turgot, who had earlier advocated a single tax, and then 
goes on to consider objections to)and arguments for his proposal. He 
lays great we i ght on the ethical side of the question, but his ethics 
are economic ethics, r ather than ethics cut off from practical applica-
tion. He believes that priv~te property is unjust, but he emphasizes 
this because, in his estimation, it will lead to the ultimate enslavery 
of the laborer, as the positions of capital and labor get farther and 
farther apart~ He believes also that private property in land is in-
consistent with its best use, and on that account, as well, should be 
abolished. Bes i de the arguments in which economic and ethi~s are both 
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essential, he urges his theory on purely financial grounds~ commending 
the single tax judged from the standpoint of the canons of t axat ion . He 
considers that it meets all requirements, in bearing lightly on preduc-
tion, in ease of collection, in certainty , and in equality of incidence. 
The foundation of these arguments on the doctrine of economic rent is 
evident. 
Thomas G. Shearman~ in "Natural Taxation," 1895 , has an excellent 
• exposition of rent from the po~nt of view of the sin1~le taxer : ~' 
"All over the world men pay to a sup erior authority a tribute 
proportioned with wonderful exactness to these social adv antages . Each 
man in compel led to do this, by the fact that other men surround him, 
eager to pay tribute to his place if he will not. The just amount 
of this tribute is deter~ined by the competion of all his neighbors; 
who calculate to a dollar just how much the privilege is worth to them , 
and who wil l gladly take hi~ place and pay in his stead . Every man must, 
therefore, pay as much as some other man will give for his place; and 
no man can be made to pay any more. 
"This tribute is sometimes paid to the state, when it is called a 
tax; but it is far more often paid to private indivjduaJ.s . when i t is 
called ground rent. 
"When there is no government , there is no ground rent . As govern-
ment grows more complex and does more for society, ground rents . inorease. 
Any advantage possessed by one piece of land over another will , it i s 
true , give rise to rent ; but that rent cannot be collected wi thout the 
aid of government ; and no advantage in fertility is ever equal in value 
to the advantage of society and government. 
"Ground rent~ therefore, is the tribute which natural l aws levy 
upon every occupant of land , as the market price of all the social as 
w~ll as natural advantages appertain i ng to that land~ including, 
necessari ly, his just share of the cost of government . 
"New observe how perfectly this natural tribute meets all the 
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requirements of abstract justice, with wh ich our professor- friends 
have so l ong wrestled in vain. Here i s the exact Quid pro guo . No 
s ane man , in any ordinary society , pays t oo much rent . For he pays no 
more than some other man is willing to pay for t he same privileges. 
He therefore pays no more than the market value of the advantag e which 
he gains over other men by occupying that prec i se pos i tion on t he earth . 
He gai ns a certain profit out of that position which he could not gain 
elsewhere. The fac t is conclusive proof that t hi s profit is no t fruit 
4 of hi s l abor· , but comes out of some superior opportunity for selli ng 
the fruits of his 1 abor· , some superior protection from government i n 
the enjoyment of those fruits , or some other advant age of mere position. 
Thus he rec eives full ~alue in exchange for hi s payment. He r eceives 
i t ; not merel y soci et y in general . He recei ves the whol e of it : he 
is not compelled to divide a dollar ' s worth of t hi s benefit with his 
ne i ghbors . But , on the ot her hand , he pays the full value of what he 
thus rec eives ; and he owes noth in~ more to anybody. The transaction 
i s closed, upon fair and equal terms." 
This expos i t ion is an excellent i nd icat ion of t he singl e taxer ' s 
s t and , and at the same t i me shows how that t heory i s built upon the 
classical theory of rent, whose formulation by Ricardo Shearman dis -
Clb ses in a footno t e in just and reasonBble t erms, tbough he does not 
~o into modifications 6r details. It would be difficult to find a 
passage showin~ more strikingl y the absolut e dependence of the single 
tax upon t he law of rent . 
Mr . Louis F. Post, in his pamphlet on the Si ngle T::1x, third edi-
tion, 1906, defines r ent as a fund made up of the a_gg_.reg_e_t e premiums 
fer Syecially desirable locations , wh ich goes to the l andlords e,s such, 
whether they l abor or not . He traces the law of rent and its impli -
cat ions i n a popular manner , but one whicb covers t he ground excel-
l ently. He fi nds in the upward tendency of Rent a s t rong argument 
for the Single Tax. This passage is an excellent i ndication of Singl e 
Tax views of the justice of r ent~ and at the same time shows cl early the 
OQ 
fundamental importance of rent in the theory : 
"Now, what is the mean ing of this tendency of rent to rise with 
social progress , wh ile Wages tend to fall? Is it not a plain pr·omise 
that if rent be treated as common property, a.dvanoes i n pl'Oducti ve 
power shall be steps in the direction of r ealizing tbrou~b orderly and 
natur al growth those grand conceptions of both the socialist and the 
individuali st , which in the present condition of society are justly 
ranked as Utopian ? It is not likewise a plain warning that if Rent 
be tr:ea,ted as private property , ad·.vances in productive power will be 
steps in the direction of making slaves of the many laborers , and 
masters of the few l and-owners? Does it not mean that common owne r -
ship of Rent is in harmony with natural law, and that its pr·ivate 
appropriation is disorderly and degrading? 7ifhe.ru the cause of Rent is 
considered in connection with the self-evident truth that God made 
earth for common use and not for prive..te monop ol y, how can a. contrary 
i nference hol d.? Caused and increased by social growth, the benefit s 
of which should be common , and attaching to the land the just right to 
which it is equal , Rent must be the natural fund for public. expenses." 
Two foot-notes of a Post's explain the ristS of rent a.s a social 
product , and the justice of the application to public ends: 
"Here , far away from civilization, is a solitary settl er . Getting 
no benefits from government, he needs no public revenues , and none of 
the land about him has any value. Anothe r settler comes ~ and another , 
until a village app ears . Some public revenue is then required . Not 
much , but some . And the l and bas a little value , only a little; per-
haps just enough t o equal the need for public revenue . Tbe village 
becomes a town. More revenues are needed , and land values are higher . 
It becomes a city . The publ ic revenues requires are e.normou.s , and so 
are the land values . " 
"Society, and society alone~ causes Rent . " Rising with the rise, 
advancing with th e growth , and receding with the decline of society, 
it measures the earning power of society as a whole as distinguished 
•• 
from that of the individuals. Wages , on the other hand~ measure the 
earning power of the individuals as distinguished from that of society 
as a whole . We have distinguished the parts into which Wealth is dis-
tributed as Wages and Rent; but it would be correct~-indeed , it is the 
same thing,- to regard all Wealth as earnings, end to distinguish the 
two kinds as Communal Earnings and Individual Earnings . 
can there be any question as to the fund from wh ich Society should be 
supported? How can it be justly supported i n any other way than out 
of its own earnings?" 
D. Post also gi ves what is purely of economic interest, an account 
of the rise of speculative rents . This he does i n a fashion truly 
Ri cardian , taking first the case of the original settlers , who appro-
pri ate all land of the first quality , forcing later settlers to work on 
land of the second qnali ty, even though all of the land of the fir·st is 
not in use. This continues through the successive classes, each one 
forcing later settlers to us e ground bel ow the actual margin of culti-
vation wer·e a.ll la.nd of higher qualities employed , and thus creating 
ren ts earlier than the& should appear , and making them higher than is 
economically just . 
0. B. Fillebrown, who has studied extensively the tax condition 
in Boston , and has incorporated his results in the "A. B. C. of Taxa-
tion ," defin-es ~round rent"' as athe a.nnual .v.alue of the exclus ive use 
and control of a given Bi"ea of la.nd , involving the enjoyment of those 
rights and privil eges pertaining to the land which are stipulated ia 
every title deed , and which, e~numerated specifically, are as follows: 
right and ease of access to water~ health i nspection, sewerage~ fir e 
protection, police, schools, libraries , museums , parks~ playgrounds , 
ste.sm and eJ.ectric railway servic1s, gas a,nd electric lighting , tele-
graph and telephone service , subways, ferries , churches , publ i c schools, 
private schools, colleges, universities and public buildings--utilities 
which depend for the i r efficiency and economy on the character of the 
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gover·nment ; which col lectively co::1stitute the economic and social 
advantages of the l and; and wh ich are due to the presence and act iv-
ity of ~opul ation, and are insepa able therefrom." 
On the Ricard i an theory , Fil.J~ ebrown sa.ys : * uPe r·sona.lly , I am 
not enamoured of Ricardo ' s statem Jnt of the l aY/ of rent fi.'Om the f act 
t hat it is couc hed in such purely agricultural terms . The definition 
c that ground rent is what l and i s worth for use ' mi ght be l ooked upon 
as an extension of Ricardo ' s defj.ll ition , out of agricultural i nto urban 
co ndi tions, and it may be a little simpler to understand because it is 
translated into terms of t he every day market . " 
In his book, Fillebrown advan.c es three practical financ i al a r guments, 
eac h of them incontrovertibl e , if the economic theory of rent is accepted. 
He considers the " A" of Tex-at ion to be ·this : Ground rent, v1hat l and is 
vwrth annually, for use, is a cre~ ltion of the community , a social pro-
due.:. . {{It i s what a man will ,g iv(; for the use of land, dependent c hi ef -
1 . • .~... .Y on expenditure, public and private, Hh ich fu rn ish tbe advantages 
necessary to give it that value. All such improveme nts are refl ected 
i n the l and value itsel f , a.nd wha1j is more i rr:portant , the incol!le from 
t bis la.nd vc,lue correspond s to the expense of government. When a sett le-
ment i s first. ma.de , the land valuj; is nothing; no one would pay rent. 
Bat the expenses of government , to be met out of t axes., are also nothing. 
I n t he course of a few years , land values are somethi ng; there is a 
li ttle rent . The expenses of government are al s o somet hi ng , and they 
are exactly equivalent to the agg :~egate r ent of the commun ity. And so 
i t ;goe s : as the r ent increases . the expenses of government inc ree~se, 
unt il the enormous r ents of 
expena es of its government . 
the T!1/)dern city correspond s to the enormous 
This eouilibrium is maintained becaus e 
r -
g:::Jvernrnent expenditures increase the desirabil i ty of the land, and that 
i nc reases the rent , reckonin g both from an intensive and an ext ensive 
mar gi n of cultivation. 
His second and third argumen ts are also economic a r guments , but 
deeling wi th the quest ion of publ ic fin ance and taxation as well as 
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viith rent. The second , aB," is · that. rent cannot be shifted. When a 
tax is once levied upon the landOl.'ner , he mus ·i:, pay it. TP' . _·n1s , of course, 
as explained before , rests on the f act that the landlord ' s surplus is 
f i xed , and cannot vary at his wil J .• The third argument, "C~" i s that 
the selling value of land i s an tntaxed value ; that every l andowner· , on 
buying his property , coniput. es the tax , and deducts that f r·om the price, --
the c ap italized value of wha t it i s worth to him for use . Thi~ argu-
ment he.s reference to taxation alone , but rent i s stiJ.l a .f actor, for 
the sell i ng price i s capitalized J'ent . 
Fil l ebrow n sums up his ol'm pos i t i on a.nd that of the other Si ngle 
Tc.x advocates mo·re succinctly in i·,he sentence : uLand value be ing, a 
soc i a l c; reat i on , and r ent be i ng sncial ly maintained , equal e.ccess to the 
ri ghts and pr ivil eges pe r taining. t.o the l and can be promoted by the taxa-
t ion of ground rent a lone, and by this means only .» Thi s is the essen-
t i al relation of the l aw of r ent ·:,o the Single Tax: To ·the public belong.s 
that whic h i t has created . 
It woul::J. be :i::::pos s i bl e to ex< ~,m i ne minutel y the writings of other 
Single Tax advocates , though we a: ready have glanced at the work of the 
f oremost men among them. But suc h a. proceeding vronl d be superfluous , 
for there can be but one i dea on ··:, he rel at i on between the lav: of r-ent 
and the Singl e Tax, the one which has been stated , and no writer c a n 
deny that relation and continue to be a S i n,gl e Taxer with even the 
rudiment s of science. The rel at: . on i s ethi c e. l as l'iell as political, 
for t here seems to be justice i n ·;he pl ea that society shoul d reap t he 
benef i t of e, product due to i ts efforts . Whether ther·e a r·e other 
soc i al products which would escap1~ taxation under this system is an 
entirely d i fferent Ques t ion and one with whi c h this paper is not con-
cerned . At any rate, the relation between rent and the Single Tax ·is 
the same: Rent i s a soc i al product which society wishes to recl a i m to 
i tself through the Singl e Tax. 
L. L. Price, i n the Economic Journal for March , 1891 , gives an 
excellent summary of this relat ion: 
"Just as the more comprehens ive form of socialism, which a i ms 
at the nationalization of cap i ta"l pur poses to be based on Rice,rdo ' s 
theo r y of value, so t he proposal for the 'nat ionalizat ion of l and ' 
is avowedly put forward as a practical deduction f rom R icardo ~s theory 
of rent . In t he one case , the t heory may be undul y strained or per-
versely misinterpreted, and the details of the practical schemes 
f ounded upon it may differ in particular cases. But their different 
schemes are cha.racter i zed by the comm on eleme.Ilt of the conception of 
an ~unearned increment~ attaching t o the ownership of land , and that 
conception i s regarded as a corollary to the theory of rent.u 
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